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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 200403 61-CA

v.
MICHALE RICHARD SCHUBARTH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals from convictions of thirteen counts of securities fraud, seven of
which were second degree felonies, and six of which were third degree felonies, in
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2000), thirteen counts of selling
unregistered securities, third degree felonies in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§61-1-7
and 61-1-21 (2000), four counts of employment of an unlicensed agent, third degree
felonies in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-3 (2000), and one count of conducting a
pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-10-1603 (1999). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (West 2004).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
la. Did defendant invite any error in the creation of a six-year abeyance term
when he negotiated for the six-year term to allow him sufficient time to repay more than
a quarter-of-a-million dollars in restitution?
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies to the issue of whether
defendant invited any error. To the extent this issue requires interpretation of the plea-inabeyance statute, '"[t]he proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law.'" State v.
Bradshaw, 2004 UT App 298, H 8, 99 P.3d 359 (quoting Rushton v. Salt Lake County,
1999 UT 36, f 17, 977 P.2d 1201).
lb. Alternatively, was any error in the six-year abeyance term harmless where
defendant violated the abeyance agreement after only six months, and the six-year term
was specifically created to benefit defendant?
Standard of Review: No standard of review applies to this issue.
2. Did the trial court correctly find that defendant violated the plea-in-abeyance
agreement by passing a bad check in Nevada when defendant admitted that he had paid a
fine to satisfy the charge?
Standard of Review: A '"trial court's factual findings are reversed only if clearly
erroneous.'" State v. Hittle, 2004 UT 46, \ 4, 94 P.3d 268 (quoting State v. Harmon, 910
P.2d 1196,1199 (Utah 1995)).
3. Did the trial court correctly interpret the plea-in-abeyance agreement to require
defendant to pay restitution of $22,880 every six months?
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Standard of Review: "A contract's interpretation may be either a question of law,
determined by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by extrinsic
evidence of intent. If a trial court interprets a contract as a matter of law, [this court will]
accord its construction no particular weight, reviewing its action under a correctness
standard. However, if the contract is ... ambiguous and the trial court proceeds to find
facts respecting the intentions of the parties based on extrinsic evidence, then [this
court's] review is strictly limited." Peterson v. Sun Rider Corp., 2002 UT 43, % 14,48
P.3d 918 (citing Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 1985)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
This case involves the interpretation of UTAH CODE ANN. §77-2a-2(5) (West
2004) which states: "A plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than 18
months if the plea was to any class of misdemeanor or longer than three years if the plea
was to any degree of felony or to any combination of misdemeanors and felonies."
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 22 May 2001 the State charged defendant with:
a) thirteen counts of securities fraud, seven of which were second degree
felonies and six of which where third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 and 61-1-21 (2000);
b) thirteen counts of selling unregistered securities, all third degree felonies
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-7 and 61-1-21 (2000);
c) four counts of employment of an unlicensed agent, all third degree
felonies in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-3 (2000); and
d) one count of engaging in a pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree
felony in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-1603 (1999).
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R. 1-12.
On 26 November 2002, defendant entered no contest pleas to all thirty-one counts
and the trial court agreed to hold the pleas in abeyance on certain conditions. R. 344-66;
a copy of the plea-in-abeyance agreement is attached as Addendum A. On 28 May 2003
the State filed a motion for an order to show cause alleging that defendant had violated
the terms of the plea-in-abeyance agreement. R. 399. On 29 January 2004 the trial court
held a hearing and found that defendant had violated the agreement. R. 557-60; 705: 1,
57-58; a copy of the transcript from the order to show cause hearing is attached as
Addendum B.
On 27 April 2004 the trial court entered defendant's no contest pleas to all thirtyone counts and sentenced defendant to serve one-to-fifteen years on each of the eight
second degree felony counts and zero-to-five years on each of the twenty-three third
degree felony counts. R. 674-76; 706: 17. The trial court ran all of the terms
concurrently. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R. 678.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Crimes
In the summer of 2000, defendant arrived in Vernal, Utah with an offer that was
too good to be true. R. 16-20. Through a company known as High Desert Financial,
defendant and his agents began selling one month promissory notes with interest rates of
10% to 20%, translating to annual rates of 120% to 240%. R. 18. Petitioner collected
more than $269,000 from investors. R. 17.
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The promissory notes were unregistered securities and neither defendant nor his
agents were licensed to sell them. R. 17. More importantly, defendant failed to disclose
to his investors that (1) High Desert Financial had filed for bankruptcy in 1998; (2)
defendant had previously filed two personal bankruptcies; (3) defendant had been
arrested at least twice for passing bad checks; and (4) he had been assessed more than
$100,000 in various federal and state tax liens. R. 17-19.
Trial Delays
The trial court originally set defendant's trial for April of 2002. R. 89. Defendant,
however, changed his retained counsel three times before trial, necessitating three
continuances of the original trial date. R. 32, 124, 133-34,140, 172, 248,253, 262-63.
The Plea-In-Abeyance Agreement
Finally, on 26 November 2002, defendant entered no contest pleas to all thirty-one
counts. R. 344-66 (Add. A). The trial court agreed to hold the pleas in abeyance for six
years. R. 351 (Add. A). In exchange, defendant agreed, among other things, to violate
no law and pay total restitution of $274,550. R. 350-51 (Add. A).
Defendant agreed to pay restitution on the following schedule:
Defendant shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of
$22,880.00 each six months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have
not been paid, the defendant will appear in this court for a hearing to
determine if he has substantially complied with the restitution payments.
R. 350 (Add A).
The agreement also stated that "[defendant shall make full payment of restitution
on or before November 26, 2008. Failure to pay the full amount of restitution on or
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before Nobember 26,2008 is a violation of this agreement and shall result in the entry on
the record of all pleas." R. 349-50 (Add. A).
If defendant paid full restitution by December 2008, and kept all other terms of the
agreement, then all charges would be dismissed with the exception of four counts of sale
of unregistered securities, third degree felonies. R. 347-48 (Add. A). The State would
then argue for probation. Id.
Defendant would get an even better deal if he paid full restitution within one year.
R. 348-49 (Add. A). If defendant paid full restitution by December 2003, and kept all
other terms of the agreement, then all charges would be dismissed with the exception of
one count of sale of unregistered securities, a third degree felony. R. 349 (Add. A). The
State would then argue for a term of probation not to exceed one year and would not
object to a motion to reduce the degree of offense, provided defendant successfully
completed probation. Id.
The Order to Show Cause Hearing
On 29 January 2004, the trial court held an order to show cause hearing based on
the State's allegations that defendant had violated the agreement by 1) failing to timely
pay restitution; 2) engaging in unlawful mortgage brokerage services in Nevada; 3)
passing a check without sufficient funds in Nevada; and 4) committing theft by false
pretenses in Nevada. R. 544-45, 557-60; 705: 1 (Add. B).
At the order to show cause hearing, Michael Hines, director of the enforcement for
the Utah Division of Securities, testified that he had conducted the investigation that led
to defendant's charges in this case and had participated in the plea negotiations with
6

defendant. R. 705: 16-17 (Add. B). Mr. Hines testified that the parties carefully
negotiated the terms for repaying restitution, including the scheduled six month
payments. R. 705: 19-20 (Add. B). He explained that defendant's counsel "made it very
clear that if we were going to require restitution that was unrealistic, we would be setting
[defendant] up to fail." R. 705: 19 (Add. B). He also testified that the State made it very
clear during the plea discussions that the six month "deadlines would have to be met." R.
705: 20 (Add. B).
The plea-in-abeyance agreement was entered 26 November 2002. R. 366 (Add.
A). Defendant paid $10,000 in restitution on 28 May 2003 and $12,880 on 8 July 2003.
R. 705: 21 (Add. B).
After defendant agreed to the terms of the plea-in-abeyance agreement, Nevada
authorities charged him with passing a check with insufficient funds and a Nevada court
issued a warrant for defendant's failure to appear on that charge. R. 705: 22-24 (Add. B).
Defendant was also bound over in Nevada district court on four charges of theft by false
pretenses. R. 705: 26-29 (Add. B). The Financial Institutions Division of the Nevada
Department of Business and Industry also ordered defendant to cease and desist his
unlicensed loan activity in Nevada. R. 705: 24-25 (Add. B).
Defendant's Evidence
Defendant testified that he pled not guilty to the bad check charge and that his
failure to appear was simply a misunderstanding. R. 705: 37-40 (Add. B). He explained
that he posted a $500.00 cash bond based on the warrant for his failure to appear. R. 705:
38-39 (Add. B). He also admitted that despite his not guilty plea, his Nevada attorney
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"paid a $101fin[e]out of his own trust account, and the Court refunded my $500 bail,"
and closed the case. R. 705: 39-40 (Add. B). Defendant also admitted that Nevada
authorities had served him with a cease and desist order. R. 705: 42 (Add. B). He
claimed, however, that the order was issued in error and that he was properly licensed to
make loans in Nevada. R. 705: 41-42 (Add. B).
With respect to the restitution repayment schedule, defendant testified that he
believed the six month payment schedule was "only a watermark, as it were," and that the
six month intervals were not strict deadlines. R. 705: 36 (Add. B). Defendant disputed
that the parties had extensively negotiated the payment schedule. R. 705: 35 (Add. B).
Rather, he claimed that his attorney simply "dropped the agreement on [him]" when he
arrived at court on 26 November 2002. R. 705: 35 (Add. B).
Defendant nevertheless admitted that he had participated in negotiating the terms
of the agreement. R. 705: 37, 50-53 (Add. B). He claimed that the State had originally
set the agreement for six years and that he "was the one that sweetened it, so to speak."
R. 705: 37 (Add. B). Defendant explained that during the negotiations he proposed that
"all this go away and [b]e reduced down to a Class A," provided he "could make these
alleged victims whole within the first year, at the end of 2003." Id.
Defendant's "sweetened" deal was included as part of the typewritten agreement
that he initialed and signed, and that the trial court executed on 26 November 2002. R.
344-66 (Add. A); 705: 50-53 (Add. B).
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The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court found that defendant violated the plea-in-abeyance agreement by 1)
failing to make his first restitution payment timely, and 2) violating the law. R. 705: 5758 (Add. B). The trial court found that defendant did not make the required restitution
payment of $22,880 on the due date. Id. at 58. It also found that defendant violated the
law because he "wrote a bad check and [has] apparently satisfied that in the Sparks,
Nevada Justice Court." Id. The trial court did not consider defendant's bind-over on the
four theft by false pretenses charges because defendant had not yet been convicted on
those charges. Id. at 57. Nevertheless, the trial court noted that defendant's pattern of
conduct was concerning. Id. at 57-58.
The trial court also found that defendant admitted that Nevada authorities had
served him with a cease and desist order. R. 705: 57 (Add. B). The trial court noted that
the "[cease and desist] order demonstrates a pattern of conduct with concerns the Court,
because that's what happened here in Utah in the present case." Id.
Regarding the length of the abeyance term, the trial court found that the six-year
term was designed to provide defendant sufficient time to repay his substantial restitution
and therefore defendant was not prejudiced by any error in the length of the agreement.
R. 705: 12 (Add. B).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant claims that his plea is invalid because the six-year abeyance term
violates section 77-2a-2(5), which limits an abeyance term for felonies to three years.
However, defendant invited any error in the six-year abeyance term because he
9

negotiated for that amount of time to enable him to pay $274,550 in restitution.
Moreover, any error was harmless because defendant violated the agreement after only
six months and the six-year term was established for his benefit.
II. The trial court correctly found that defendant violated the plea-in-abeyance
agreement by passing a bad check in Nevada. Although defendant claims that the
evidence was insufficient to support this finding, he ignores the only evidence on which
the trial court relied: his admission that he had paid a fine to satisfy the bad check
charge.
III. The trial court correctly interpreted the abeyance agreement to require
defendant to pay restitution of $22,880 every six months. The language of the agreement
is unambiguous. But even if ambiguous, the evidence demonstrated that the parties
intended to establish a firm schedule for restitution payments. The trial court also
correctly found that defendant's first payment, which was not paid in full until nearly two
months after the due date, did not substantially comply with the agreement's
requirements.
ARGUMENT

I. DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR BASED ON THE
CREATION OF A SIX-YEAR ABEYANCE TERM;
ALTERNATIVELY, ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS
Defendant argues that the plea-in-abeyance agreement is invalid because it created
a six-year abeyance term, contrary to section 77-2a-2(5). Br. Aplt. at 10-13. That section
states: "[a] plea shall not be held in abeyance for a period longer than ... three years if
the plea was to any degree of felony."

UTAH CODE ANN.
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§ 77-2a-2(5) (West 2004).

Defendant argues that this Court should declare a misplea and remand the case for trial.
Br. Aplt. at 13. This Court should not allow defendant to benefit from an error he invited.
"The invited error doctrine provides that 'on appeal, a party cannot take advantage
of an error committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the
error.'" State v. Montiel, 2004 UT App 242, \ 14, 95 P.3d 1216 (quoting State v. Dunn,
850 P.2d 1201, 1220 (Utah 1993)).
Defendant invited any error in the length of the abeyance period. He specifically
negotiated for the six-year abeyance term to give him sufficient time to pay the
substantial restitution he owed. Michael Hines testified that the restitution payment
schedule was carefully negotiated and that defendant's attorney "made it very clear
[during plea negotiations] that if we were going to require restitution that was unrealistic,
we would be setting [defendant] up to fail." R. 705: 19 (Add. B). Defendant also
specifically agreed to the six-year period as evidenced by his initials on the plea
agreement. R. 351 (Add. A). Moreover, in his third claim on appeal, defendant relies on
the agreement's six-year deadline to support his claim that the trial court misinterpreted
the agreement to create strict six-month deadlines for restitution payments. Br. Aplt. at
17-21. Consequently, defendant invited any error in the six-year term and cannot benefit
therefrom. See Montiel, 200 UT App 242 at \ 14.
Alternatively, any error was harmless. As discussed above, defendant negotiated
the six-year abeyance period to give him sufficient time to repay the substantial
restitution he owed. Moreover, defendant violated the agreement after only six months,
well within even the statutory three-year limit. The statutory three-year limit will not
11

even expire until 26 November 2005. Defendant could not be harmed by any error in the
length of the agreement unless the State sought to enforce the plea agreement beyond the
statutory three-year limit. Because any error arising from the six-year abeyance period
was harmless, defendant's first issue fails.
Should the Court nevertheless find reversible error, defendant is correct that a
misplea should be declared and the matter remanded for trial. See State v. Moss, 921
P.2d 1021, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (affirming the trial court's declaration of a misplea
and scheduling of a preliminary hearing where defendant's plea-in-abeyance to attempted
sexual abuse of a child violated section 77-2a-3(7), which expressly prohibits abeyance
agreements to sexual crimes against children).
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
DEFENDANT HAD VIOLATED THE PLEA-IN-ABEYANCE
AGREEMENT BY WRITING A BAD CHECK
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously found that he violated the plea-inabeyance agreement by writing a bad check because the State relied on inadmissible
hearsay to establish the crime, and, in any event, the State's evidence was insufficient.
Br. Aplt. at 13-16. Defendant argues that the only evidence the State produced to prove
he passed a bad check was hearsay testimony from Michael Hines that Nevada authorities
told him they had charged defendant with passing a bad check, and a certified copy of a
Nevada court docket showing that defendant had been charged with, but not convicted of,
passing a bad check and that he had failed to appear on the charge. Id. However,
defendant ignores his admission that his attorney paid a fine to satisfy the bad check
charge.
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Defendant testified that he "believed [his Nevada attorney] entered [his] plea of
not guilty" to the bad check charge. R. 705: 39 (Add. B). Despite claiming that he had
pled not guilty, however, defendant admitted that his Nevada attorney "paid a $101 fm[e]
out of his own trust account, and the Court refunded my $500 bail. They sent it back to
me and that case was closed, as far as I know, because the Court sent my bail back to
me." Id. at 39-40.
Based on this testimony, the trial court correctly found that defendant had
committed the crime of passing a bad check and had satisfied his punishment for that
crime by paying a fine. Defendant failed to explain why, having pled not guilty, he paid
a fine and the case was closed. A not guilty plea would have presumably led to a trial.
Instead, defendant paid a fine and his bail was refunded. R. 705: 39-40 (Add. B).
Consequently, the trial court correctly found that defendant "did violate a law. He wrote
a bad check and [h]as apparently satisfied that in the Sparks, Nevada Justice Court." R.
705: 58 (Add. B). This finding alone was sufficient to find defendant in violation of the
plea-in-abeyance agreement. And this finding—based on defendant's admission—was
supported by more than sufficient evidence.
III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY FOUND THAT
DEFENDANT'S LATE RESTITUTION PAYMENT VIOLATED
THE PLEA-IN-ABEYANCE AGREEMENT
Defendant does not dispute that his first restitution payment was late. Br. Aplt. at
17-21. Indeed, at the order to show cause hearing, defendant's counsel admitted that
"[defendant] did pay what would be the $22,880, which was the first payment, but the
same was late." R. 705: 55 (Add. B).
13

Defendant nevertheless contends that the trial court erroneously interpreted the
plea agreement to find that the late payment violated the agreement. Br. Aplt. at 17-21.
Under defendant's interpretation of the agreement, the only strict deadline is 26
November 2008, the date on which he was to have paid full restitution. Id. at 18.
Defendant contends that the agreement's "substantial compliance" language allows that
"the individual six month payments did not need to be paid in full or on exact dates as
long as [defendant] was making substantial payments toward the full restitution or a
substantial payment toward $22,880.00 for that six month period." Id. at 19. He
contends that if the agreement establishes strict six-month deadlines, then the "substantial
compliance" language is meaningless. Id. at 20. Defendant misunderstands the
agreement.
The relevant language of the agreement provides that defendant "shall pay
restitution" of $274,550.00. R. 350 (Add. A). The agreement then states that
"[defendant shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of $22,880 each six
months. If payments in the amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will
appear in this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially complied with the
restitution payments." Id. The agreement also provides that "[defendant shall make full
payment of restitution on or before November 26,2008." Id.
"Many courts, including the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court, have referred to plea agreements as contracts and have applied principles derived
from contract law to plea agreements." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 386 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) (additional citations omitted). "[Cjontract principles 'cannot be blindly
14

incorporated into the criminal law in the area of plea bargaining.'" Id. (quoting United
States v. Ocanas, 628 F.2d 353, 358 (5th Cir. 1980)). Nevertheless, contract principles
provide relevant guidance for interpreting plea agreements. See United States v.
Thompson, 237 F.3d 1258, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) ("We will apply accepted principles of
contract law to determine whether one party or the other has violated a plea agreement").
When interpreting a contract, the intentions of the parties are controlling. See
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc's., 2002 UT 3,112, 40 P.3d 599.
This Court will "'first look to the four corners of the agreement to determine the
intentions of the parties.'" Id. (quoting Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 113
P.2d 1382,1385 (Utah 1989)). "If the language within the four corners of the contract is
unambiguous, the parties' intentions are determined from the plain meaning of the
contractual language, and the contract may be interpreted as a matter of law.'" Id.
(quoting Dixon v. Pro Image, Inc., 1999 UT 89, If 14, 987 P.2d 48). In evaluating
whether the plain language is ambiguous, [this Court will] attempt to harmonize all of the
contract's provisions and all of its terms." Id. Additionally, "all of its terms should be
given effect if it is possible to do so." Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc's., 752 P.2d
892, 895 (Utah 1988). "'An ambiguity exists where the language is reasonably capable
of being understood in more than one sense.'" Central Florida Investments, Inc., 2002
UT 3, at If 12, (quoting Dixon, 1999 UT 89, at \ 14) (additional quotations omitted).
The trial court correctly interpreted the plea agreement to require defendant to pay
$22,880 every six months. The agreement unambiguously requires that "[defendant
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shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of $22,880 each six months." R.
350 (Add A).
Contrary to defendant's interpretation, the "substantial compliance" clause does
not render the agreement ambiguous or excuse defendant from making the individual
payments "in full or on exact dates." Br. Aplt. at 19. Nor does interpreting the
agreement to establish strict six-month deadlines render the "substantial compliance"
clause meaningless. Br. Aplt. at 20.
The agreement unambiguously requires defendant to pay "$22,880.00 each six
months." R. 350 (Add. A). The "substantial compliance" clause merely establishes what
is to happen if defendant does not fulfill his obligation under the agreement. If defendant
does not make the required payment timely, then the "substantial compliance" clause
provides that defendant will not be in violation if he has "substantially complied with the
restitution payments." Id.
This interpretation of the agreement harmonizes and gives effect to all its terms.
See Central Florida Investments\ 2002 UT 3, at \ 12; Buehner Block Co., 752 P.2d at
895. In contrast, defendant's interpretation ignores the mandatory language of the
agreement that "[defendant shall make payments toward restitution in the amount of
$22,880.00 each six months." R. 350 (Add. A).
Defendant contends that the State's own testimony demonstrates that the
agreement did not establish strict deadlines or amounts. Br. Aplt. at 19-20. But
defendant misreads the transcript of the order to show cause hearing. First, the
prosecutor, in questioning Michael Hines, asked "was it also ordered then that
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[defendant] was to make regular payments specifically approximately $22,000 each six
months?" R. 705: 19 (Add. B). Defendant highlights the prosecutor's use of the word
"approximately." Br. Aplt. at 19. The prosecutor, however, was not "testifying" that the
agreement required only approximate payments. Rather, the prosecutor used the word
"approximately" because he was not quoting the exact figure from the agreement.
Defendant next cites the prosecutor's question to Mr. Hines that "the first sixmonth period would roughly be around the May 26th date," emphasizing the word
"roughly." Br. Aplt. at 20 (quoting R. 705:20 (Add. B)). Again, the prosecutor was not
"testifying" that the agreement established only "rough" deadlines. Rather, he used the
word "roughly" to indicate that he was merely estimating the due date as May 26th
because he had not calculated exactly six months from the entry of the agreement.
In any event, the language of the agreement, not the text of the prosecutor's
questions, establishes defendant's responsibilities under the agreement. As discussed
above, the language of the agreement unambiguously required defendant to pay "$22,880
each six months." R. 350 (Add. A).
"Contract terms are not necessarily ambiguous simply because one party seeks to
endow them with a different meaning than that relied upon by the drafter." Buehner
Block Co., 752 P.2d at 895. Unlike defendant's interpretation of the agreement, the trial
court's interpretation harmonizes and gives effect to all of the agreement's terms.
Therefore, the trial court correctly held that defendant's admittedly late payment was a
violation of the agreement.
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Even if defendant were correct that the agreement was ambiguous, the evidence at
the order-to-show-cause hearing demonstrated that the parties intended to establish strict
six-month deadlines. Mr. Hines affirmed that the restitution payment schedule was
"carefully negotiated and carefully explained." R. 705: 19 (Add. B). He testified that the
State's intent "was in getting back some money to the investors who had lost this amount
of money. So we made it very clear in those discussions that those deadlines would have
to be met." R. 705: 20 (Add. B). The trial court had discretion to discount defendant's
testimony to the contrary. See State v. Comer, 2002 UT App. 219, \ 15, 51 P.3d 55 ("the
court has considerable discretion to assign relative weight to the evidence before it. This
discretion includes the right to minimize or even disregard certain evidence") (quoting
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). Therefore, even if the
language of the agreement were ambiguous, triatrial court correctly held that the
agreement established strict six-month deadlines for each restitution payment.
The trial court also properly found that defendant had not substantially complied
with the agreement. The trial court executed the plea-in-abeyance agreement on 26
November 2002. R. 344, 366 (Add. A). Defendant's first restitution payment of $22,880
was therefore due on 26 May 2003. Defendant's first payment totaled only $10,000—
less than half of what he owed—and was made on 28 May 2003. R. 21. While defendant
did pay $12,880 on 8 July 2003, that second partial payment was nearly two months late.
This was not substantial compliance with the abeyance agreement.
Additionally, evidence indicated that defendant may have used illegally obtained
funds to pay his restitution. Defendant admitted that the Financial Institutions Division
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of the Nevada Department of Business and Industry had ordered him to cease and desist
his mortgage loan activity in Nevada. R. 705: 24-25,42 (Add. B). Nevada has also
bound defendant over on four counts of theft by false pretenses. R. 26-28. The trial court
was properly concerned about defendant's pattern of conduct. R. 705: 57-58 (Add. B).
Therefore, it correctly found that defendant had not substantially complied with the
restitution payment schedule. Id.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's order finding
that defendant violated his plea-in-abeyance agreement and entering defendant's no
contest pleas.
Respectfully submitted jj
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

DEPUTY

IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,
AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT IN
ADVANCE OF GUILTY- PLEA
AND AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No.

MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH
DOB: 07/09/1955

011800166

Judge John R. Anderson
Defendant.
I, Michael Richard Schubarth, hereby acknowledge and certify
that I have been advised of and that I understand the following
facts and rights:
Notification of Charges
I am pleading ajiadrty to the following crimes:
Crime & StatutoryProvision
1.

Securities Fraud

2.

Securities Fraud

Degree

Third Degree
Felony
Second Degree
Felony

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum MandatoryMax.
0 to
Max.
1 to

$5,000.00 Fine
5 Years USP
$10,000.00 Fine
15 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

4.

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

5.

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP
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Crime & Statutory
Provision
Securities Fraud
Securities Fraud

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

Second Degree
FelonyThird Degree
Felony

Max. $10,000.00 Fine
1 to 15 Years USP
Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Third Degree
FelonyThird Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Securities Fraud

Second Degree Max,
1 to
FelonySecond Degree Max.
Felony
1 to

Securities Fraud
Securities Fraud

Securities Fraud

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

$10,000.00 Fine
15 Years USP
$10,000.00 Fine
15 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP
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Crime & Statutory
Provision

Degree

Punishment
Min/Max and/or
Minimum Mandatory

23.

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

24.

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

25.

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

26.

Sale of Unregistered

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

27.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

28.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

29.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP"

30.

Employment of
Unlicensed Agent

Third Degree
Felony

Max. $5,000.00 Fine
0 to 5 Years USP

31.

Pattern of Unlawful
Activity

Second Degree Max. $10,000.00 Fine
Felony
1 to 15 Years USP

I have received a copy of the Information against me.

I

have read it, or had it read to me, and I understand the nature and
the_ elements of crime(s) to which I am pleading guil-fey.
The elements of the crime (s) to which I am pleading
guilty are:
COUNT 1 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about July 7, 2000, in violation of Utah Code
Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the defendant,
MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did willfully,
in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any security to
James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed any device scheme
or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue statement of a
material fact or omitted to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading; and/or engaged in any
act, practice, or "course of business which operated or would
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operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the amount was
$10,000.
COUNT 2
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about December 11, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to James E. Burns, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 3
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about October 2000, in violation of
Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Dusty (Johnson) Grothusen, directly or indirectly;
employed any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any
untrue statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of
the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading;
and/or engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which
operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and
the amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 4
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about January 16, 2001, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Brian Jensen, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 5
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about September 12, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of

any security to Michael Nielson, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 6
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about January 29, 2001, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Brian Skinner, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and\- the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 7 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about November 16, 2000, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was $10,000.
COUNT 8 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about December 18, 2000, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to Scott Sorenson, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
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COUNT 9 SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah County,
State of Utah, on or about November 29, 2000, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that the
defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, did
willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of any
security to 01in Draney, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
COUNT 10
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about September 21, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
COUNT 11
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Third Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about November 10, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party.to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Julie Pierce, directly or indirectly; employed any
device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was less than $10,000.
COUNT 12
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about September 6, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
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necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 13
SECURITIES FRAUD, a Second Degree Felony, in Uintah
County, State of Utah, on or about December 15, 2000, in violation
of Utah Code Ann.§61-1-1 and §61-1-21, 1953, as amended, in .that
the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense,
did willfully, in connection with the offer, sale or purchase of
any security to Arlene Thompson, directly or indirectly; employed
any device scheme or artifice to defraud; and/or made any untrue
statement of a material fact or omitted to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or
engaged in any act, practice-, or course of business which operated
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person and the
amount was more than $10,000.
COUNT 14
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about July 7, 2000'^ in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 15
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 11, 2 0 00, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to James
E. Burns, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 16
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about October 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Dusty
(Johnson) Grothusen, in Utah which was not registered with the
Division, nor was the investment a federally covered security for
which a notice filing had been made with the Division, nor did the
security qualify for an exemption from registration.
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COUNT 17 SALE OP UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 16, 2001, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian
Jensen, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 18 SALE OP UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 12, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Michael
Nielson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 19 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felonyu., in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about January 29, 2001, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Brian
Skinner, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 20 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 16, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 21 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 18, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Scott
Sorenson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
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COUNT 22 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 29, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Olin
Draney, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 23 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 21, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie
Pierce, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 24 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony;, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about November 10, 2000, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Julie
Pierce, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor was
the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 25 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about September 6, 20 00, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene
Thompson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
COUNT 26 SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, a Third Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, in or about December 15, 20 00, in
violation of §61-1-7, and §61-1-21, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, a party
to the offense, did willfully offer or sell any security to Arlene
Thompson, in Utah which was not registered with the Division, nor
was the investment a federally covered security for which a notice
filing had been made with the Division, nor did the security
qualify for an exemption from registration.
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COUNT 27
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about September
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer,
did willfully employ or engage Amy J. Garcia, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 28
EMPLOYMENT OP UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about December
2000, through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer,
did willfully employ or engage James E. Burns, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 29
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000,
through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did
willfully employ or engage Lloyd V. Wales, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 30
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, a Third Degree Felony,
in the county of Uintah, State of Utah, from in or about June 2000,
through in or about December 2000, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§61-1-3 (1997) MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, as a broker dealer, did
willfully employ or engage Nathan S. Hardman, an agent who was not
licensed with the Utah Division of Securities.
COUNT 31 PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, a Second Degree Felony, in
Uintah County, State of Utah, from on or about June 16, 2000
through January 29, 2001 in violation of §76-10-1603, Utah Code
Annotated 1953 as amended, in that the defendant, MICHAEL RICHARD
SCHUBARTH, a party to the offense, received proceeds derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity as more
fully defined in Counts 1 through 30 above, in which they
participated as a principal, or they used or invested, directly or
indirectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income,
or the proceeds derived from the investment or use of those
proceeds, in the acquisition of any interest in, or establishment
or operation of, any enterprise; through a pattern of unlawful
activity acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, any
interest in or control of any enterprise; or were employed by, or
associated with any enterprise and conducted or participated,
whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of that enterprise's
affairs through,a pattern of unlawful activity.
The unlawful
activity included three or more violations of securities fraud.
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I understand that by pleading g«rrJTCy
gtrirfEy II will
will be
be remitting
remitting
4^iat- T ^aryrmrn 1-t-pd the crimes listed above.

I stipulate and agree

that the following facts describe my conduct and the conduct of
other persons for which I am criminally liable.

These facts

provide a basis for the court to accept my guilty pleas and prove
the elements of the crime(s) to which I am pleading guilty:
Count(s) 1 - 1 3

SECURITIES FRAUD

Count(S) 1 3 - 2 6

SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY

Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0

EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT

Count 31

PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

Waiver of Constitutional Rights
I am entering these pleas voluntarily. I understand that
I have the following rights under the constitutions of Utah and the
United States.

I also understand that if I plead guilty I will

give up all the following rights:
&

Counsel: I know that I have the right to be represented

by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed by the court at no cost to me. I understand that I might
later, if the judge determined that I was able, be required to pay
for the appointed lawyer's service to me.

9-

I (have not) (h^fe) waived my right to counsel. I certify

that I have read this statement and that I understand the nature and
elements of the charges and crimes to which I am pleading guilty.
I also understand my rights in this case and other cases and the
consequences of my guilty plea(s).

3S?

If I have not waived my right to counsel, my attorney is
Blake Nakamura.

My attorney and I have fully discussed this

statement, my rights, and the consequences of my guilty plea(s).
<&

J\iry Trial.

I know that I have a right to a speedy and

public trial by an impartial (unbiased) jury and that I will be
giving up that right by pleading guilty.
Confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses. I know
that if I were to have a trial I would have the right to see and
observe the witnesses in open court who testified against me and b)
my attorney, or myself if I waived my right to an attorney, would
have the opportunity to cross-examine all of the witnesses-, who
testified against me in open court.
\0

Right to compel witnesses. I know that if I were to have

a trial, I could call witnesses if I chose to and I would be able
to obtain subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of those
witnesses.

If I could not afford to pay for the witnesses to

appear, the State would pay those costs.
U^J

Right

incrimination.

to

testify

and

privilege

against

self-

I know that if I were to have a trial, I would have

the right to testify on my own behalf. I also know that if I chose
not to testify, no one could make me testify or make me give
evidence against myself. I also know that if I chose not to testify,
the jury would be told that they could not hold my refusal to testify
against me and if it were a non-jury trial, the judge would not hold my
refusal against me.
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Presumption of innocence and burden of proof.

I know

that if I do not plead guilty, I am presumed innocent until the
State proves that I am guilty of the charged crime(s) . If I choose
to fight the charges against me, I need only plead "not guilty,"
and my case will be set for a trial. At a trial, the State would
have the burden of proving each element of the charge(s) beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must
be unanimous, meaning that each juror would have to find me guilty.
\JQ

I understand that if ^I^plead guilty, I give up the

presumption of innocence and wirL\be admittMigfrfratT commifrtod the
crime(s) stated above.
X

Appeal.

I know that under the Utah Constitution, if I

were convicted by a jury or judge, I would have the right to appeal
my conviction and sentence.

If I could not afford the costs of an

appeal, the State would pay those costs for me. I understand that
I am giving up my right to appeal my conviction if I plead guilty.
«K\

I know and understand that by pleading guilty/ I am

waiving and giving up all the statutory and constitutional rights
as explained above.

_

Consequences of Entering a Qa±TE\E P3rea~
Potential penalties.

I know the minimum and maximum

sentence that may be imposed for each crime to which I am pleading
guilty.

I know that by pleading guilty to a crime that carries a

mandatory penalty, I will be subjecting myself to serving a

36/

mandatory penalty for that crime.

I know my sentence may include

a jail/prison term, fine, or both.
1^

I know that in addition to a fine, an eighty-five percent

(85%) surcharge will be imposed. I also know that I may be ordered
to make restitution to any victim(s) of my crimes, including any
restitution that may be owed on charges that are dismissed as part
of a plea agreement.
(\y

Consecutive/concurrent prison terms.

I know that if

there is more than one crime involved, the sentences may be imposed
one after another (consecutively) , or they may run at the same time
(concurrently).

I know that I may be charged an additional- fine

for each crime that I plead to.

I also know that if I am on

probation or parole, or awaiting sentencing on another offense of
which I have been convicted or which I have plead guilty, my guilty
plea(s) now may result in consecutive sentences being imposed on
me.

If the offense to which I am now pleading guilty occurred when

I was imprisoned or on parole, I know the law requires the court to
impose consecutive sentences unless the court finds and states on
the record that consecutive sentences would be inappropriate.

8

Trial judge not bound.

I know that any charge or

sentencing concession or recommendation of probation or suspended
sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing, made
or sought by either defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are
not binding on the judge.

I also know that any opinions they

express to me as to what they believe the judge may do are not
binding on the judge.

Defendant's Certification of Voluntariness
I am entering this plea of my own free will and choice.

No

force, threats, of unlawful influence of any kind have been made to
get me to plead guilty. No promises except those contained in this
statement have been made to me.
I have read this statement, or I have had it read to me by an
attorney, and I understand its contents and adopt each statement in
it as my own.

I know that I am free to change or delete anything

Contained in this statement, but I do not wish to make any changes
because all of the statements are correct.
I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorney.
I am

4 f

years of age-

I have attended school through the

f2/M grade. I can read and understand the English language. If
I do not understand English, an interpreter has been provided to
me.

I was not under the influence of any drugs, medication, or

intoxicants which would impair my judgment when I decided to plead
guilty.

I am not presently under the influence of any drug,

medication, or intoxicants which impair my judgment.
I believe myself to be of sound and discerning mind and to be
mentally

capable

of understanding

consequences of my plea.

these proceedings

and the

I am free of any mental disease, defect,

or impairment that would prevent me from understanding what I am
doing or from knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entering my
plea.

.
I understand that if I want to withdraw myigasx%fev plea(s), I

must file a written motion to withdraw my plea(s) within 30 days

after I have been sentenced and final judgment has been entered.
I will only be allowed to withdraw my plea if I show good cause.
I will not be allowed to withdraw my plea after 30 days for any
reason.
&

Plea bargain.

My plea is a result of a plea bargain

between myself and the prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties
and provisions of this plea agreement, if any, are fully contained
in this agreement and are as follows:
1.

I hereby enter my plea of guilty to the charges of:
Count(s) 1 - 1 3

SECURITIES FRAUD

Count(s) 1 3 - 2 6

SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY

Count(s) 2 7 - 3 0

EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT

Count 31

PATTERN OE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY

A) C#£M~~
2.

Upon acceptance of the -gtrrity plea, the State does

hereby recommend that the Court place the plea in abeyance and not
cause it to be entered upon the records for a period of SIX (6)
YEARS on the following terms:
^

a.

Defendant hereby agrees to make himself

available to report to the Court whenever requested to do so and
further agrees to keep' both his attorney and the Uintah County
Attorney apprised as to his current mailing address at all times.
@

b.

Defendant hereby agrees to violate no laws of

the United States, the State of Utah, or any municipality during
the term of this agreement.

In the event that Defendant is

arrested, cited, or otherwise charged with any violation, Defendant

3S>

shall notify the County Attorney's office within 72 hours of said
violation.
vSn

c. Defendant shall pay restitution to named victims

as listed in the information and victims listed herein which are
not listed in the information as follows:
James Burns
Dusty Grothusen
Brian Jensen
Michael Nielson
Brian Skinner
Scott Sorenson
Olin Draney
Julie Peirce
Arlene Thompson
Darlene Burns
Mark Caldwell
Lisa Glick
Floyd Morton
Linette Rollins
Dale Kidd
Carol Dixon
TOTAL
d.

$50,000.00
$11,000.00
$14,000.00
$15,000.00
$35,000.00
$12,500.00
$9,100.00
$7,500.00
$59,000.00
$20,000.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$5,000.00
$10,000.00
$10,000.00
$1,450.00
$274,550.00

Defendant shall make payments toward restitution

in the amount of $22,880.00 each six months.

If payments in the

amount of $22,880.00 have not been paid, the defendant will appear
in this court for a hearing to determine if he has substantially
complied with the restitution payments. / The sole is^sHite for review
is whether there has been substantial compliaa^e with the payment
agreement.

The defendant expressly waives any/bright he may have

for the court to hear arguments concerning hts ability to pay. \
^

e. Defendant shall make full payment of restitution

on or before November 26, 2008.

'to

Failure to pay the full amount of

restitution on or before November 26, 2008 is a violation of this
agreement and shall result in the entry on the record of all pleas.
V~%

Full payment of restitution is an absolute term of this

agreement.

Failure by defendant to pay full restitution for any

reason shall result in a violation of this agreement and result in
the entry of all pleas on the record.
\o

That this matter come before the court for review on the

second law and motion day in Nj^rernber 2003, at 10:00 a.m. or at
such other time as the Court may hereinafter set.

If at that time

the Court finds that all the restitution has been paid and there
have been no other violations of the plea agreement, the defendant
will be allowed to withdraw his plea of guilty to the charges of
(1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES,
(27-30) EMPLOYMENT

OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and

(31) PATTERN OF

UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the court may then entertain a motion from
the Defendant to dismiss these charges.

The State will concur in

such motion if there have been no violations of the agreement, the
restitution has been paid and there are no violations pending.
Count 26, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES will then enter
against the defendant.
said charge.

The defendant will then be sentenced on

The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison

time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this
matter. The State will argue for a term of probation not to exceed
1 year.

The State will not object to a Motion by the defendant to

reduce the charge to the next lower category only in the following
circumstances:
&

l/&

a.

Defendant is placed on probation;

b.

Defendant

is subsequently

discharged

from probation

without violating any terms of his probation;
c.

Defendant violates no

laws during

the term of his

probation an up until his motion to reduce the category
of the offense; and
d.

Defendant

successfully

completes

the

term

of

his

probation.
\J

If the defendant does not have all the restitution paid

on or beforej&oyember- 26, 2003, but does have the restitution paid
on or before November 26, 2008, then this matter will

come before

the court for review on the second law and motion day in November
2008, at 10:00 a.m. or at such other time as the Court may
hereinafter set.

If at that time the Court finds that all the

restitution has been paid and there have been no other violations
of the plea agreement, the defendant will be allowed to withdraw
his plea of guilty to the charges of (1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD, (1426)

SALE

OF

UNREGISTERED

SECURITIES,

(27-30)

EMPLOYMENT

OF

UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY, and the

court may then entertain a motion from the Defendant to dismiss
these charges. The State will concur in such motion if there have
been no violations of the agreement, the restitution has been paid
and there are no violations pending.

®

Counts 23-26, SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITIES, will then

enter against the defendant. The defendant will then be sentenced
on said charges. The State agrees not to argue for jail or prison

time, or a fine in light of the substantial restitution in this
matter.

The State will argue for probation.

\\/)
the

I f , a t a n y t i m e d u r i n g t h e t e r m h e r e o f , it c o m e s to
attention

of t h e U i n t a h

failed

to comply

with

County

Attorney

may

County

Attorney

a n y of t h e t e r m s

then

go

to

that

of this

the Court

Defendant has
agreement,

and

the

request, by

appropriate motion and affidavit, an Order to Show Cause requiring
Defendant to appear and show cause why judgement

for

(1-13)

SECURITIES FRAUD, (14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY, (27-30)
EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and

(31) PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL

ACTIVITY should not be imposed and Defendant sentenced accordingly.
Service of said Order to Show Cause may be had upon defense counsel
and Defendant does hereby waive personal service upon him of any
such order.

If, after, a hearing, the Court makes a finding that

there is evidence that Defendant has failed to strictly comply with
all terms of this agreement it shall immediately order imposition
of the

(1-13) SECURITIES FRAUD,

(14-26) SALE OF UNREGISTERED

SECURITY, (27-30) EMPLOYMENT OF UNLICENSED AGENT, and (31) PATTERN
OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY judgement and Defendant shall be sentenced
accordingly.

if

Dated this 26th day of November, 2002.,/I

MICHAEL RI
DEFENDANT

3^7

Certificate of Defense Attorney
I

certify

that

I am

the attorney

for MICHAEL

RICHARD

SCHUBARTH, the defendant above, and that I know he has read the
statement or that I have read it to him.

I have discussed it with

him and believe that he fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of
my knowledge and belief, after an appropriate investigation, the
elements

of

the

crime(s)

and

the

factual

synopsis

of

the

defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated; and these, along
with

the other representations

and declarations made by the

defendant in the foregoing affidavit, .are accurate and true.

BLA^>AKAMURA
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

21
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Certificate of Prosecuting Attorney
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in
the case against MICHAEL RICHARD SCHUBARTH, defendant.

I have

reviewed this Statement of Defendant and find that the factual basis
of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the offense(s)
is true and correct. No improper inducements, threats, or coercion
to

encourage

a plea

has been

offered

defendant.

The plea

negotiations are fully contained in the Statement and in the attached
Plea Agreement or as supplemented on the record before the Court.
There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would support
the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s)
are entered and that the acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the
public interest.

G. MARK THOMAS
PROSECUTION ATTORNI

22
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Order
The Court, having heard the representations made to it by
counsel, having determined that Defendant is fully aware of his
constitutional rights and of the purpose of this proceeding,
accepts Defendant's pleas of guilty and finds that it is knowingly
made and that he is under no undue stress or influence. The Court
further approves the terms of the agreement set forth hereinabove
and orders that Defendant's plea of guilty be placed in abeyance
and that judgment not be entered against Defendant at this time but
rather that imposition of judgment be stayed pursuant to the terms
of the above set forth agreement until the
Motion Calendar in
Court may order.
herein

against

Law and

or until such other time as the
Until such time as judgment is formally entered

Defendant,

or

charges

are

dismissed

against

Defendant, Defendant is ordered to comply with all terms of the
above set forth agreement and failure to do so shall be dealt with
accordingly to the terms thereof.
DATED this 26th day of November, 2(

JDERSON
)istrict Court Judge
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on January 29, 2004)

3

THE COURT: Good morning.

4

MR. THOMAS: Good morning, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Okay.

This is State of Utah versus Michael

6

Richard Schubarth.

7

here.

8

date and time set for evidentiary hearing on the question of

9

whether the plea in abeyance should be revoked for substantial

10

The defendant is present.

Mr. Beaslin is

Mr. Thomas is here representing the State.

This was the

noncompliance.

11

I guess as a matter of housekeeping there are some

12

issues that the Court should address or at least raise.

13

received from Mr. Schubarth a motion to terminate Mr. Beaslin,

14

it was dated July 6 —

15

21st.

or January 16th.

I

I received that January

Now, Mr. Schubarth, is that still an issue?

16

MR. SCHUBARTH: Yes.

17

THE COURT: Okay.

Well, indigent defendants have a

18

Constitutional Right to Court appointed Counsel.

19

have the right to substitute Counsel or complain about Counsel

20

unless there is good reason.

21

They do not

I suppose I need to inquire of you, Mr. Schubarth, as

22

to some specific grounds of dissatisfaction.

Let me advise you

23

that because Mr. Beaslin does not have a substantial securities

24

practice or is not a so-called expert in securities law isn't

25

going to apply because there is no one that we could appoint
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that would meet that qualification.

2

this point.

3

This is a criminal case at

You also indicated that Counsel has not followed

4

through with specific requests.

5

going to jump through hoops for you unless there is some

6

the lawyer has control of what should be done.

7

he hasn't met with you in a timely manner, and he's not duly

8

informed.

9

I want to tell you —

Well, your lawyer is not
—

You indicate

I want to ask you about that,

10

and then I want to ask you about this conflict of interest that

11

you've alleged.

12

He is not going to continue in a case where he perceives a

13

conflict of interest, but I'd like you to tell me —

14

elaborate on that.

Mr. Beaslin is an ethical and a good lawyer.

or

15

MR. SCHUBARTH: The conflict of interest part first?

16

THE COURT: Yes, uh-huh.

17

MR. SCHUBARTH: My understanding that one of my co-

18

defendants, Nathan Hardman, Mr. Beaslin's represented him in

19

the most recent past.

20

understand that he was a partner with you at some point in time

21

in the past.

22

not.

23

That there might be a conflict there.

I

I don't know if that is grounds for a conflict or

I asked him prior —

when we had first met, if he

24

would do a conflicts check the first week in January of all

25

the people involved, all of the alleged victims, all the
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codefendants, and that didn't happen, and it came up in

2

conversation as early as last Saturday, which confirms some

3

of the concerns I had that he has represented some of the

4

codefendants in this thing.

I have a concern about that.

5

I don't know how deep your relationship was between

6

you and Mr. Beaslin, but there is a potential concern for me

7

about that, too.

8

questioning his abilities.

9

very complex case.

I am not questioning his ethics.

I'm not

I think this is a very, very,

I think his time is limited.

I think he

10

would agree with me on that.

He doesn't have the time or the

11

wherewithal to go through this, but there is people that he has

12

represented that are involved in this case.

13

THE COURT: Well, let me indicate to you that this is

14

a small community and Mr. Beaslin may very well have defended

15

or represented some of the codefendants or the victims, but

16

certainly not connected with this case.

17

have you discussed that with Mr. Schubarth?

18

any conflicts?

Mr. Beaslin, do you
Do you perceive

19

MR. BEASLIN: I didn't see any, your Honor.

20

about it when I saw that Mr. Hardman had been subpoenaed by"

21

Mr. Thomas, but that case involves a burglary and a theft and

22

has nothing to do with this other —

I thought

this case.

23

THE COURT: Are you still actively representing him?

24

MR. BEASLIN: Yeah, I am, your Honor.

25

—

I believe that

Mr. Thomas and I settled that last week, and he's going to
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enter a plea on those charges in about a week in Judge Payne's

2

Court, but it has nothing to do with this matter.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

Mr. Beaslin, do you feel that your

4

communications with Mr. Schubarth as his lawyer has affected

5

your ability to professionally represent him?

6

MR. BEASLIN: Probably not.

I think the ultimate issue

7

here —

I've gone through everything.

In fact, I was advised

8

early this morning.

9

and it's just going to be a question of whether or not, as

I've got everything here that you have,

10

suggested, that they're merely saying that there's not been the

11

payments.

12

The allegations remain here.
I've talked to his attorneys, both Blake Nakamura and

13

also to John (inaudible).

I talked to him late last night,

14

and he represents him in the Nevada cases as to the counts out

15

there.

16

feels strongly about it, then you can have somebody else.

So I don't feel there's a conflict.

If —

unless he

17

THE COURT: Well, again, the relative cases are such

18

that the indigent defendant is not in a position to pick and

19

choose, unless I find there's some good reason for substitute

20

Counsel.

21

was a partner with Mr. Beaslin, but our relationship was always

22

good.

23

got a complaint about that, it's probably Mr. Thomas, but

24

that's been 10 years ago.

25

anymore.

I have been on the bench for 11 years.

That would probably be to your advantage.

Before that I

If anyone's

I don't even make that announcement

I will tell you now that I would not have any

-7
1

prejudice or bias one way or the other against Mr. Beaslin.

2

I'm going to find at this point, Mr. Schubarth,

3

that Mr. Beaslin —

that there isn't really good ground to

4

substitute lawyer.

I'd like to have a securities lawyer come

5

in here and represent you, but unfortunately one wouldn't do

6

it for what the indigent defense Counsel are paid.

7

stuck.

8
9
10

So you're

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, may I also for the record
state that State's response to his motions.

Have you seen my

written responses?

11

THE COURT: I have not.

12

MR. THOMAS: I've provided a written response.

13

THE COURT: I'm particularly interested in your written

14

responses or what you have to say about the later set of

15

motions.

16

MR. THOMAS: Yeah, I don't have a written response on

17

that set of motions.

I didn't have time to prepare a written

18

response, but I do have responses

19

THE COURT: What I

20

MR. THOMAS: —

21

—

—

as to the issue of an attorney, though,

I would address that.

22

THE COURT: Okay, make a record.

23

MR. THOMAS: Yeah.

Just for purposes of the record

24

I think it should be clear, one of the allegations that the

25

defendant claimed was a conflict with potential witnesses, but
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I think that the Court needs to remain in the context of this

2

particular hearing.

3

facts of the case, unless a securities attorney is not either

4

necessary, nor advisable.

We're not here to decide the underlying

5

The only issue here is whether or not there was

6

compliance with the terms of a plea in abeyance, and any

7

criminal defense attorney would be able to identify those

8

issues and deal with that.

9

THE COURT: Yes.

10

MR. THOMAS: Also, the underlying offense is not being

11

tried.

12

Mr. Beaslin is representing, would or may have been a witness

13

in the State's case prior to the plea, but that's not the issue

14

here either.

15

A person (inaudible) that he has acknowledged that

So —

and there were a few other issues, but I think

16

based on the Court's ruling I need not say anything about that.

17

THE COURT: Okay, help me with this one. I am concerned

18

about this one.

19

MR. THOMAS: Yes.

20

THE COURT: The statute says a plea in abeyance cannot

21

exceed three years.

What are we going to do with that?

22

MR. THOMAS: I reviewed that statute as well, and that

23

was brought up, of course, by the defendant in his handwritten

24

motion.

25

State has is, number one, this was a carefully negotiated plea,

In examining that statute, the first response the
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and the purpose for the six year plea in abeyance was for —

2

the outset was because the defendant owed in excess of $250,000

3

in restitution.

4
5

at

THE COURT: Well, obviously it was for his benefit to
extend it so that he could comply.

6

MR. THOMAS: It was.

7

THE COURT: That's a given.

8

MR. THOMAS: Right.

9

THE COURT: But the statute doesn't seem to

10

—

MR. THOMAS: The statute doesn't give a leeway for

11

that.

What typically will happen, as the Court is aware, is if

12

we come along for a review for a plea in abeyance and someone

13

hasn't complied,with it, then the Court will extend that plea

14

in abeyance for a longer period of time.

15

THE COURT: That happens all the time.

16

MR. THOMAS: Yeah, and in this particular case —

17

it's similar to a probation terminating and restarting.

18

this particular case we wrote into the agreement for the

19

benefit of the defendant the six years.

•20

and
In

However, if the Court finds that that portion of the

21

plea agreement is in violation of the statute, the State —

and

22

if we don't —

23

substantial noncompliance, then the State would just ask that

24

that portion of the plea in abeyance be stricken.

25

length of the term be changed in the agreement to reflect the

if the Court does not find that there has been

That the
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appropriate three years, and the amount of restitution be

2

adjusted so that the payments are larger and more frequent.

3

THE COURT: Mr. Beaslin, do you want to speak to that?

4

MR. BEASLIN: Well, I've reviewed that motion also,

5

your Honor.

That's 77-2 (a)2(5) on that three-year abeyance as

6

indicated.

7

the —

8

they generally extend it to go that way anyway.

9

that that's kind of where we are on that, but it is in the code

I think that heretofore on pleas of abeyance, if

if they can only comply within a particular time, then

10

a three-year statute for felonies in the —

11

up then.

12

So I think

that he be brought

But like I say, if that were to happen, you'd really

13

have to kick up the payments to double what they are now.

14

Right now they're $22,500 every six months.

15

$45,000 payment every six months if you were to change it to a

16

three-year statute, your Honor.

17

That would be a

MR. THOMAS: And if I may also add before the Court

18

makes a ruling, this particular hearing is brought within the

19

three-year time period.

20

of 2002.

21

that the plea was not complied with or that that term was not

22

within the meaning of the statute, I think the Court still

23

has jurisdiction even under the statute to either apply

24

noncompliance within the three-year period or alter that

25

portion of the agreement, your Honor.

He entered his plea on November 26th

So any determination that the Court makes either

-11THE COURT: Yeah, and I guess the alternative is —

1

2

the

alt ernative is to set it aside totally and find a trial date.
MR. THOMAS

3

Well, as to the —

and let me just respond

If the Court determines to set aside the plea in

4

thi s way.

5

abe yance portion as for the violation of the plea in abe yance,

6

the State would ask —

7

def endant actually pled guilty to.

there were a few counts that the

8

THE COURT: Yes, I understand.

9

MR. THOMAS : Those were actually entered on the record.

10

We could

—

11

THE COURT: Yeah.

12

MR. THOMAS : —

13
14

in abeyance.

just do the ones that were on thle plea

That would be the alternative.

THE COURT: In fact, I looked through —

I picke d that

15

up in the file somewhere, and he did enter guilty pleas to some

16

of them that were not held in abeyance.

17

MR. THOMAS

18

THE COURT: And sentencing was delayed.

19

MR. THOMAS : That is correct.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

That is correct.

So your position would be if I

21

decide to set aside the plea in abeyance, those pleas would

22

still be good.

23

MR. THOMAS

24

THE COURT: Sentencing on those and find a trial date

25

for the remainder?

Right.
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MR. THOMAS: That's what the State requests.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

Well, I'm going to rule on this.

3

I think with the statute —

4

mandatory, "shall not exceed three years," I think that because

5

of the fact that the attorneys negotiated this plea in abeyance

6

to accommodate the defendant in not setting him up to fail,

7

but giving him an opportunity to do what he agreed to do, the

8

—

9

years, I think in substance I can't demonstrate any prejudice

10
11

although the statute is fairly

whether the language said three years to be renewed or six

to the defendant.

I'm going to say that it's okay.

The other thing I need to talk about, I guess, is that

12

the defendant says that he was not advised of his right to be

13

sentenced timely.

14

out and look at the actual transcript of the hearing, and the

15

following dialogue happened.

I had my clerk go back and get the record

16

In fact, as I recall, Mr. Nakamura went through the

17

dialo gue of all of the rights pretty fast and indicated that

18

Mr. Schubarth understood those.

19

through it pretty fast, so I went though them again.

20

through them again.

I thought Mr. Nakamura went
I went

21

The following language from the record says that I

22

said, quote, "You will need to raise your right to a speedy

23

trial, speedy sentencing, speedy trial rights because of the

24

fact this agreement runs for six years.

25

you're giving up that right," end of quote.

We need to understand
The defendant
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responded, "Yes, your Honor."

2

covered, and I'm going to deny his motion on that.

3

So I think that's pretty well

I guess what we need to do now, Mr. Schubarth, are

4

there any —

5

ruled on?

6

is there anything that's still out there I haven't

MR. SCHUBARTH: Well, your Honor, I'm reviewing the

7

notes of the hearing on the 26th, I believe, of November, and

8

I pled no contest, but that everything was held in abeyance.

9

didn't plead guilty to anything.

10

I

THE COURT: Well, I guess we can find out by looking at

11

the record, because the document —

the plea agreement doesn't

12

—

13

stuff in the file that I looked at that said he did enter pleas

14

to some of them.

says everything was held in abeyance, but there's some other

15

MR. SCHUBARTH: It's right here, your Honor.

16

MR. THOMAS: Let me look at that.

17

MR. SCHUBARTH: Everything was held in abeyance.

18

THE COURT: The record will straighten this out.

19

don't need to even argue about it.

20

that out.

21
22

The record will straighten

MR. THOMAS: I think it's actually on page 19 of the
plea in abeyance agreement, even though they're not numbered.

23

MR. SCHUBARTH: Which paragraph?

24

MR. THOMAS: Towards the bottom.

25

We

It says, "Counts

XXIII to XXVI, sale of unregistered securities was entered
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against the defendant.

2

said charges."

The defendant will then be sentenced on

3

THE COURT: Where are we?

4

MR. BEASLIN: On page 19.

5

MR. THOMAS: Yeah, it's on the bottom of page 19.

6

THE COURT: Well, mine isn't numbered.

7

Help me with this.

So I would

is it where we're talking about Count XXVI?

8

MR. THOMAS: Yes.

9

THE COURT: Okay, and where on the page is that

10
11

—

language?
MR. THOMAS: Toward the very bottom, that last

12

paragraph in the little slash mark there where the defendant

13

would have initialed it.

14

of unregistered securities."

15

or the page has some indentation on it.

16

may be helpful.

It says, "Counts XXIII to XXVI, sale
The document some indentation

—

If I may approach, it

17

THE COURT: Yeah.

Show me and then show Mr. Beaslin.

18

MR. BEASLIN: I have it here, your Honor.

19

THE COURT: Oh, I was way off.

20

MR. THOMAS: Right in there.

21

THE COURT: Okay.

22

MR. THOMAS: Mr. Beaslin has that, but the language

Okay.

23

states, "Counts XXIII to XXVI, sale of unregistered securities

24

will then enter against the defendant.

25

be sentenced on said charges."

The defendant will then

Then it goes into our agreement
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that we would not argue for jail or prison if he paid the

2

substantial restitution.

3

So even in the plea in abeyance document itself

4

it was always anticipated that he would —

5

would enter against him.

6

or held in abeyance was the sentencing so that he could take

7

into consideration —

8

consideration his compliance with payment.

9

that those counts

The only thing that was delayed

so that the State would take into

The previous paragraphs to that set forth two

10

different circumstances wherein if he paid his restitution

11

early, we would make a more generous recommendation versus if

12

he did not pay his

—

13

THE COURT: Okay.

14

MR. THOMAS: —

restitution early on the sentencing,

15

but it was always considered that he would —

16

be some counts entered against the defendant.

17
18

that there would

THE COURT: And Counts XXIII to XXVI were in fact
entered?

19

MR. THOMAS: Yeah.

20

THE COURT: Yeah, and that was my understanding, but

21

I couldn't —

22

agreement.

23
24
25

it's been so long I couldn't find it in this

MR. THOMAS: Yeah, and that's where it is in the
agreement itself.
THE COURT: Okay.

So I'll let you proceed, Mr. Thomas.
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2

MR. THOMAS: Thank you, your Honor.

I would call

Mike Hines.

3

COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony

4

you're about to give in the case now before the Court will be

5

the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help

6

you God?

7

THE WITNESS: I do.

8

MICHAEL HINES,

9

having been first duly sworn,

10

testified as follows:

11

DIRECT EXAMINATION

12

BY MR. THOMAS:

13

Q.

Will you please introduce yourself to the Court.

14

A.

Yes, I am Michael Hines, the Director of Enforcement

15

for the Utah Division of Securities.

16

Q.

And how long has this been your position?

17

A.

Since 1995, June the 1st.

18

Q.

And what are your duties in that particular position?

19

A.

I supervise the investigators and attorneys that

20

oversee the administrative, civil and criminal sanctions for

21

securities violations.

22
23

Q.

And on occasion do you involve yourself with an

investigation of complaints of securities violations?

24

A.

On occasion I do, yes.

25

Q.

Did you in fact involve yourself with an investigation
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on a report of a Michael Schubarth?

2

A.

I did, yes.

3

Q.

Okay, and Michael Schubarth is the defendant in

4

today's action seated at the defense Counsel's table?

5

A.

That is correct.

6

Q.

And during that investigation you actually were able

7

I recognize him.

to speak with him; is that correct?

8

A.

That is correct, I was.

9

Q.

And identify who he was?

10

A.

That is correct, yes.

11

Q.

Okay.

Now, moving on, not discussing the specific

12

investigation you did, but more toward were there charges filed

13

against the defendant, based on your investigation?

14

A.

Yes, they were.

15

Q.

Okay, and there were a substantial number of charges?

16

A.

That is correct, like 37.

17

Q.

And let me ask you, were you involved in discussions

18

with the County Attorney and defense Counsel during the plea

19

negotiations between the State and the defendant, Michael

20

Schubarth?

21

A.

Yes, numerous times.

22

Q.

Okay, and were you also present in Court when the

23

defendant actually entered pleas?

24

A.

Yes, sir, I was.

25

Q.

Okay, and was the defendant represented by Counsel at
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that time?

2

A.

3
4

Yes, at that time Blake Nakamura was representing

Mr. Schubarth.
Q.

And during the plea negotiations and also —

well, let

5

me just go directly to the hearing.

6

the defendant entered his pleas, did the defendant acknowledge

7

that he understood the pleas and the agreement that he was

8

entering?

9

MR. BEASLIN: I think I'd object to that as to what he

10

knows, your Honor.

11

thinking at the time.

12
13

During the hearing where

He doesn't know what Mr. Schubarth was

MR. THOMAS: I didn't ask for a thought.
had —

I asked if he

if the defendant acknowledged that he understood.

14

THE COURT: Okay, I'll allow that.

15

THE WITNESS: Yes, both outside and in the courtroom,

16
17
18

both.
Q.

BY MR. THOMAS: Okay, and was there a written plea

agreement as part of the —

in this entry of plea?

19

A.

Yes, sir, there was.

20

Q.

Okay.

Now, that particular agreement —

you're

21

familiar with the legal term "plea in abeyance;" is that

22

correct?

23

A.

24

often.

25

Q.

I am.

We recommend them from the Division quite

That's correct.
And in this case that was what was —

a portion of the
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counts were recommended in this case had a plea entered and

2

held in abeyance,- is that correct?

3

A.

Yes, that is correct.

4

Q.

And as part of the terms of that plea in abeyance

5

the defendant was required to make restitution to a number of

6

victims in this case?

7

A.

That is correct.

8

Q.

And do you recall roughly the amount of restitution

9

that was ordered?

10
11

A.

It was in excess of $200,000, but I don't remember the

exact amount.

12

Q.

Okay, and was it also ordered then that he was to make

13

regular payments specifically approximately $22,000 each six

14

months?

15

A.

That is correct.

16

Q.

Now, was that a term that was carefully negotiated and

17
18

carefully explained that it had to be complied with?
A.

It was, and Mr. Nakamura made it very clear that if

19

we were going to require restitution that was unrealistic, we

20

would be setting Mr. Schubarth up to fail, and there was a lot

21

of —

22

Mr. Schubarth felt he could actually pay in satisfaction to the

23

victims.

24
25

Q.

a lot of discussion that went into the dollar amount that

Okay, and was the timing, each six months, also a

significant part of the plea negotiations and actually formed
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2

a portion of the agreement?
A.

That's correct.

The State's interest and the

3

Division's interest was in getting back some money to the

4

investors who had lost this amount of money.

5

very clear in those discussions that those deadlines would have

6

to be met.

7

Q.

8

Okay.

Now, let me also ask you, then, this agreement

was entered November 26th of the year 2002; is that correct?

9

A.

That is correct, yes.

10

Q.

Okay.

11

So we made it

So the first six-month period would roughly be

around the May 26th date

—

12

A.

That's correct.

13

Q.

—

14

A.

That's correct, and we actually set a date with

15
16

of 2003?

Mr. Nakamura that he understood.
Q.

Okay.

Now, if I can retrieve these.

17

MR. SCHUBARTH: I have a copy.

18

MR. THOMAS: Okay, may I approach the witness?

19

THE COURT: You may.

20
21

Q.

BY MR. THOMAS: I'm handing you what's been marked as

State's Exhibit No. 1.

Do you recognize that exhibit?

22

A.

I do, yes.

23

Q.

And have you briefly reviewed that exhibit?

24

A.

I have reviewed it, yes, sir.

25

Q.

Okay, and is that a certified copy of restitution
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payments made by the defendant in this matter?

2

A.

Yes, it is certified.

3

Q.

Okay, and does it indicate when the first payment came

4

in from the defendant?

5

A.

Yes, sir, it does.

6

Q.

And what date is shown on that document that was the

7
8
9
10

first payment?
On May the 28th of 2003, approximately two,days after

A.

the due date, there was a payment made of $10,000.
Q.

Okay, and that was roughly just less than half of what

11

was owed?

12

A.

Yes, sir, that's correct.

13

Q.

Okay, and what was —

14

do the documents also reflect

the date of the second payment?

15

A.

Yes, sir, they do.

16

Q.

And what date did the second payment come in?

17

A.

On July the 8th of 2003 there was a payment of $12,880.

18

Q.

And that would have completed the amount that was

19

necessary for one payment?

20

A.

Yes, if roughly two months late.

21

Q.

Okay.

22
23
24
25

So in fact, the defendant was just shy of two

months late completing that portion?
A.

Yes, sir, that's correct.
MR. THOMAS: All right.

State's Exhibit No. 1.

It is —

Your Honor, I would offer
as a self-authenticating
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document.

It is a certified copy of the restitution payments

2

received in this case.

3

THE COURT: Okay.

4

MR. BEASLIN: No objection, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Court will receive those.

6

(Exhibit No. 1 received into evidence.)

7

Q.

Mr. Beaslin?

BY MR. THOMAS: After this plea had entered, had you

8

received notification from any Nevada authority that the

9

defendant had been charged with issuing a bad check?

10

A.

Yes, I was notified by the Nevada Attorney General's

11

Office that he had been criminally charged, and that a warrant

12

had been issued for his arrest for issuing a bad check.

13

Q.

Okay.

During that were you also notified and/or did

14

you have an opportunity to review documents that defendant also

15

received a warrant for failure to appear in that particular

16

case?

17
18

A.

MR. BEASLIN: Did anything —

23
24
25

the warrant was for

just on voir dire just a

minute.

21
22

That was —

failure to appear in the bad check case.

19
20

Yes, that's correct.

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
BY MR. BEASLIN:
Q.

Do you have anything after June 3rd, 2003 to determine

whether or not he was picked up on that or failed to appear?
A.

On that particular warrant, I do not.
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Q.

Nothing after that?

2

A.

I have no knowledge of what occurred after that.

We

3

ended up with another warrant being issued, so I don't know the

4

disposition of the original warrant.

5

Q.

So this really addresses a charge having been filed

6

and his failure to appear, but it doesn't say what happened to

7

it, right?

8

A.

That is correct.

9

MR. BEASLIN: I think maybe I'd object to that, your

10

Honor, as to the issue because it doesn't set forth what

11

happened after that or if he was picked up or what happened.

12

It only says a charge was made.

13
14
15

THE COURT: I'll receive it, but as a matter of weight
I don't —

I question, you know, whether —

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I'm going to offer Exhibit 2,

16

and it is not —

17

weight it does carry, your Honor.

18
19
20
21

it's not presented for any more than what

MR. BEASLIN: That it was just filed, is all; is that
what you're saying?
MR. THOMAS: Correct, it was filed and that there was a
failure to

—

22

MR. BEASLIN: But no action?

23

MR. THOMAS: Well, we —

24
25

I'll receive it.

action or not.
MR. BEASLIN: After that?

I don't know whether there was
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MR. THOMAS: Yeah.

I don't know.

All I'm presenting

2

the Court is that there were these criminal charges filed.

3

That's what weight it is to carry.

4

(Exhibit No. 2 received into evidence.)

5
6
7

DIRECT EXAMINATION (resumed)
BY MR. THOMAS:
Q.

Let me also ask you, did you have conversations with

8

the Nevada securities authorities in regards to concerns that

9

they had about business transactions that the defendant was

10
11

involved with?
A.

I did, and I initiated that conversation in probably

12

May of 2003.

13

told me that he was a victim of a crime of Mr. Schubarth.

14

response to that I contacted Charles Moore with the Division of

15

Securities in Nevada.

16

of Financial Institutions in Nevada.

17

Q.

I received a phone call from Clifton Reeves, who
In

I also ended up contacting the Division

Okay, and as part of that are you familiar with a

18

cease and desist order that was issued by the Nevada Securities

19

Division in relation to Mr. Schubarth?

20

A.

I believe it was issued by the financial institutions.

21

Q.

Okay, and exactly what is that cease and desist order

22

in relation to this case?

23

the Court what happened.

24
25

A.

Were you —

if you can explain to

Mr. Schubarth was ordered to cease any of his

unlicensed loan activity at that point in time.
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2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Q.

Okay, and that was based on a concern that in fact he

was involving himself with unlicensed loans; is that correct?
A.

That is correct.

Taking fees on unlicensed —

and

offering unlicensed loans.
Q.

Okay, and specifically that would have been a

violation of Nevada code?
A.

That would be a violation of their Financial

Institutions Code, yes.
Q.

Okay.

Now, let me move beyond the cease and desist

10

order that was issued, and did you receive any additional

11

information that an actual criminal investigation was underway?

12

A.

Yes, I did.

13

Q.

And did you have an opportunity to visit with the

14

investigator of that case?

15

A.

Yes, many times.

16

Q.

And who was that?

17

A.

Teresa Duffy, D-u-f-f-y.

18

Q.

And did you visit with her about the charges —

or the

19

allegations that were being made, and the potential criminal

20

charges against the defendant?

21
22
23
24
25

A.

Yes.
MR. BEASLIN: Your Honor, I would object to that as

being hearsay, your Honor.
MR. THOMAS: And based on the nature of this hearing
being an order to show cause hearing, I believe that there is a
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—

well, I'm certain that the Rules of Evidence are relaxed,

2

particularly as to hearsay.

3

I am going to lay some foundation, though, wherein

4

the State will be admitting and/or submitting to the Court

5

certified copies of Court records which can come before

6

the Court, because they are certified copies and self-

7

authenticating.

8

statement.

9

Part of those will include a probable cause

I thought it would be helpful for the Court, however,

10

to utilize a witness on the stand to discuss the contents of

11

that probable cause statement, but I can do it either way, your

12

Honor.

13
14

THE COURT: I'm going to allow it as being trustworthy
and foundational.

15

Q.

16

question.

17

criminal allegations, did she indicate to you what the concern

18

was and what potential charges there may be?

19

A.

20

with —

BY MR. THOMAS: Okay.

Let me go back, then, to the

In your conversations with Ms. Duffy concerning the

Yes, she did.

We discussed with the prosecutor and

or I discussed with the prosecutor and Teresa Duffy

21

THE COURT: Can you give me a time frame on this?

22

THE WITNESS: Your Honor, that would have probably

—

23

been late May of 2003, or May of 2003, but we discussed the

24

allegations of two complaints; one from Vanessa Wright, and the

25

other one from Mr. Reves.

As to whether or not those would be
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1

violations of securities laws —

2

as United States versus Austin, which makes those transaction

3

securities —

4

could be filed, which subsequently were filed.

5

were theft related or theft by deception related charges.

6

Q.

and we discussed cases such

also there was alternate potential charges that
I believe those

BY MR. THOMAS: Okay, and did you also discuss and have

7

an opportunity to review the probable cause statement that was

8

filed with the criminal information in those matters?

9

A.

Yes, I've read several versions of those, yes.

10

Q.

Okay.

Can you just briefly explain to the Court the

11

conduct that was set forth in those probable cause statements

12

that were alleged to be violations of law?

13

A.

Certainly.

The first two charges are felony theft

14

charges which deal with what we refer to in the industry as an

15

advanced fee scheme.

16

you can make for them a large loan, and you ask for money up

17

front.

18

advance.

19

That is, you go to someone, allege that

You subsequently fail to deliver the loan, and keep the
Those constitute the two theft charges.
The subsequent charges that were filed dealt with

20

money that was supposed to be held in escrow by Mr. Schubarth

21

and his misuse of that money.

22

Q.

In other words, it was not actually held in escrow?

23

A.

That's correct.

24

Q.

And that would be a violation of law?

25

A.

In Nevada and in Utah.

It was spent from the escrow account.
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2
3

Q.

Okay, and did in fact criminal —

was a criminal

Information filed in Nevada?
A.

4

Yes, it was.
MR. THOMAS: Okay.

Your Honor, I would offer State's

5

Exhibit No. 3, which is a certified copy of the criminal

6

Information.

7

THE COURT: Okay.

8

MR. BEASLIN: I have a copy that's certified, your

9

Honor.

10
11
12

Mr. Beaslin, have you seen that?

THE COURT: Okay.
Q.

BY MR. THOMAS: And that criminal Information charges

four charges that are considered felonies; is that correct?

13

A.

That is correct.

14

Q.

Now, let me ask you, was there any relation or concern

15

that the defendant was engaging in similar types of conduct in

16

Nevada that we had had occurring in Utah?

17

A.

Only in that he entered his agreement on securities

18

violations in the state of Utah, and in the state of Utah we

19

would have filed a conduct of securities violations, but other

20

than that the scheme to defraud was different.

21

Q.

But it was still a scheme to defraud, nonetheless?

22

A.

I would have reached that conclusion if asked to

23
24
25

apply, yes.
Q.

Okay, and if —

yeah, if I can just now give the

Court some background on what types of conduct the State was
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concerned with in the Utah case.

2

use here?

3

A.

What types of schemes did he

In the State of Utah Mr. Schubarth through agents

4

offered and sold promissory notes to numerous individuals.

5

Promissory notes are securities, and he did totally inadequate

6

disclosure.

7

of the notes —

8

bankruptcy, fresh bankruptcy, and that Mr. Schubarth, the maker

9

of the note and the signer of the note, also had a bankruptcy.

10

Q.

Basically he failed to disclose that the issuer
that is, High Desert Financial —

had filed a

And during that investigation did you also do an

11

analysis or —

12

use of (inaudible) coming from Utah into his (inaudible), and

13

did it appear that he was using them for investment purposes,

14

as he had suggested to investors?

15

A.

16

expenses.

17
18

Q.

and/or a partial analysis of the defendant's

Well, it appeared that he used the money for his own

And is that similar to what it appeared he used the

money in Nevada?

19

A.

That is correct.

20

Q.

And do you know whether those four counts, there has

21

been any significant hearing in the state of Nevada concerning

22

the criminal charges?

23

A.

Yes, there was a probable cause hearing in which

24

Mr. Schubarth was bound over to stand trial on all four

25

felonies.
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MR. BEASLIN: I have a copy.

2

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I have a certified copy also

3

of the bind over order, and a proffer.

4

to me by the evidence or waiver of preliminary hearing,

5

preliminary examinations that there is probable cause to

6

believe that the offenses have been committed," listing four

7

counts of theft, felonies in the state of Nevada.

8

offer this as an exhibit.

9

It says, "It appearing

THE COURT: That's Exhibit what?

10

MR. THOMAS: 4.

11

THE COURT: 4.

12

(Exhibit No. 4 received into evidence.)

13
14

17

I'll receive 4.

MR. THOMAS: Thank you.

Nothing further of this

witness.

15
16

I would

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. BEASLIN:
Q.

Mr. Hines has referenced to you and Mr. Nakamura and

18

Mr. Thomas saying at the negotiating stage in November 26 of

19

2002.

20

come up with that agreement?

21

A.

Where did you folks meet or how did you get together to

Most of the discussions were outside of the courtroom.

22

There had been numerous telephone calls between Mr. Nakamura

23

and myself and Mr. Thomas and myself, but it took —

24

remember correctly, more than an hour out in the hallway

25

negotiating.

if I
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Q.

But prior to that —

this is November 26th —

would it

2

have been like September, October, November, a period of time

3

to accumulate that agreement?

4

A.

Uh, yes.

5

Q.

It wasn't done that day.

6

A.

It

7

Q.

It was assigned that day, but it —

8
9
10
11
12
13

—
you negotiated

before that; is that correct?
A.

We negotiated extensively before that, but there were

a lot of changes made that particular day.
Q.

The question or the no contest changes that appear in

the affidavit?
A.

Well, I believe the —

yeah, the no contest was a

14

discussion Mr. Nakamura and I had earlier, and the Division

15

had no objections to a nolo plea.

16

whether or not the Division would be supportive of a plea in

17

abeyance on a number of the counts was discussed.

18

discussions cumulated in the discussions in the hallway.

19

Q.

Certainly discussions of

All of these

And do you recall, were you at the hearing on May 2 8th

20

when the matter was reviewed?

21

after the first six-month period, and then the payment was made

22

on the 28th.

23
24
25

A.

Do you recall coming —

I don't believe I was present for that.

that was

I don't

remember that.
Q.

So you didn't come out to that hearing to determine
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whether or not there had been compliance with the plea in

2

abeyance?

3

A.

I did not, that I remember.

4

Q.

Were you then notified by Mr. Thomas or somebody else

5
6

that the payment —
A.

a $10,000 payment had been made?

I was notified that the payment was late, and then

7

subsequently notified a few months later that the rest of the

8

first due payment had been made.

9

Q.

Okay, and also you indicated and testified that you

10

became aware of the Nevada problem sometime in May; is that

11

true?

12

A.

Yes, that is correct.

13

Q.

And then you carried on conversations and so forth

14

with the Nevada authorities as to what was going on with

15

Mr. Schubarth at that time?

16

A.

Yes, sir,-that's correct.

17

Q.

And up to the time on August 19th when the complaints

18

were actually filed in the Justice Court in Nevada, the amended

19

complaint that was filed against Mr. Schubarth not in the

20

District Court, but in the Justice Court, which was the

21

pleadings that we had in the transcript of the bind over, it's

22

Exhibit 4.

23

A.

Forgive me, I lost your question in that.

24

Q.

My question is whether or not these four —

25

aware that the Justice Court —

you were

the initial complaint was filed
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2

August 19th in Nevada?
A.

I'm not sure I knew the exact date it was filed.

I

3

was certainly in negotiation with —

or not negotiation, but

4

discussions with authorities in Nevada up until the point in

5

time and subsequent to the point in time that those charges

6

were- filed.

7

Q.

And that was with Ms. Duffy?

8

A.

Teresa Duffy and then also at least one or more of the

9
10

prosecutors in Nevada.
Q.

Yeah, the preliminary hearing was not held until

11

October in November —

October and November of 2003.

It was

12

after the filing in August of these pleadings that we have here

13

today; is that correct?

14

A.

That is correct, right.

15

Q.

And the bind over went up to the District Court on

16

November 10th, it looks like, in Nevada, from this document

17

here?

18

A.

Yes, the dates on the document would be correct.

19

Q.

You indicated that there was really not a similarity

20

with the transaction in Utah as opposed to the transactions in

21

Nevada.

22

false pretenses, and (inaudible) and embezzlement, whereas

23

yours were securities fraud, most of them?

Those charges, of course, are theft, theft, theft, and

24

A.

That's correct, yes.

25

Q.

Okay, on the charges he did plea to that are evidenced
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2

in the affidavit in abeyance of this guilty plea?
A.

Yes, those were securities transactions.

However, the

3

conduct Mr. Schubarth did in the state of Nevada subsequent to

4

his plea we would have charged as securities fraud in the state

5

of Utah, rather than a theft.

6
7

Q.

I see.

So your testimony you would have filed

differently if it had occurred in Utah rather than in Nevada?

8

A.

Yes, sir, that is correct.

9

Q.

Based on what Ms. Duffy told you and on her report?

10

A.

No.

11

Based on the representations made by the two

victims of Mr. Schubarth.

12

Q.

I see, Mr. (Inaudible) and (Inaudible)?

13

A.

That's who —

that's correct, yes.

14

MR. BEASLIN: All right, thank you.

15

MR. THOMAS: Nothing further, your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

17

MR. THOMAS: State has no further witnesses.

18

We'll

submit it.

19

THE COURT: Okay.

20

MR. BEASLIN: May I have a minute. Judge?

21

THE COURT: Yes.

22

MR. BEASLIN: Okay, we'd call Mr. Schubarth.

23

COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony you

24

are about to give in the case now before the Court will be the

25

truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you

-351

God?

2

THE WITNESS: Yes.

3

MICHAEL R. SCHUBARTH,

4

having been first duly sworn,

5

testified as follows:

6

DIRECT EXAMINATION

7

BY MR. BEASLIN:

8

Q.

Would you state your name, please.

9

A.

Michael middle initial "R" Schubarth.

10

Q.

And Mr. Schubarth, you have been present during the

11

testimony of Mr. Hines; have you not?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

And would you dispute any of the statements that he

14

has made

—

15

A.

I dispute

16

Q.

—

17

—

with reference to the securities and with reference

to your conduct?

18

A.

I dispute virtually everything he said.

19

Q.

In what manner?

20

A.

Well, first and foremost, it's my understanding there

21

was no extensive negotiation of any plea in abeyance agreement.

22

When I showed up on the 26th of November my attorney dropped the

23

agreement on me.

24

outside.

25

We argued extensively in the conference room

We almost walked away from here and went to trial,

-361

because I had no knowledge of the plea agreement whatsoever,

2

and my attorney explained to me that it was in my best interest

3

to take the plea, in that it was —

4

review every six months.

5

there would be subject to

That the payments were only a watermark, as it were.

6

That if I could make a payment within six months.

7

short, then I could make it up in the next six-month review.

8

could pay any amount at any time.

9

If I was

It could have been floating.

I was not told that I pled guilty to anything.

My

10

understanding and in the hearing documents that I pled no

11

contest, and everything was held in abeyance for a six-year

12

period.

13

statute.

14

not taken the plea whatsoever and we would have gone to Court.

15

I don't believe I'm guilty, and I have not broken the law.

16

I

No one explained to me the law about three-year
If that would have been explained to me I would nave

My understanding also the plea in abeyance agreement,

17

that if I fell short on the payments or if I was convicted of

18

any crime, that would be cause for substantial failure of the

19

plea agreement.

20

I've been alleged of some crimes that are totally false.

21

have nothing to do with securities.

22

I talked to Dan —

So I have not been convicted of any crimes.
I

David Evans in the securities

23

division.

I've talked to him substantially for years after

24

Mr. Hines had stirred up trouble for me in Nevada, and I think

25

it was in July specifically that there was talk about a warrant
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for my arrest in Nevada and this bad check charge.

2

David Evans and I said, "Do you guys have a problem with me?"

3

He said, "No, you haven't violated any securities laws."

4

I talked to

So I've done everything that I know possible to stay

5

clean, to stay with this agreement, even though I wasn't in

6

agreement with the agreement, and I only saw it that morning

7

when I arrived here, and I was told that I had to substantially

8

not comply with it for it to fall off.

9

I was the one that sweetened it, so to speak.

They

10

put it out at six years, the State did.

11

"If I can make these alleged victims whole within the first

12

year, at the end of 2003, can all this go away and he reduced

13

down to a Class A, attempted sale, I believe, one count?"

14

after that was entered there was a conversation of then it

15

being expunged from my record so that there would be no record

16

of this whatsoever.

17

I came back and said,

Then

It's always been my position as well as the State's

18

that the alleged victims are made whole here.

19

prison, not that I be put away, and not that they not receive

20

any restitution whatsoever.

21

myself and the State to make these people whole, whether I did

22

anything wrong or not, or anybody else was guilty.

23

With regards to —

Not that I go to

It's always been the position of

I covered the plea negotiations.

24

With regards to the bad check allegation, the failure to

25

appear, I received a summons by mail I believe it was the end

-381

of May.

It was on a Friday.

It was certified letter.

2

know that I signed for it or if somebody in the office signed

3

for it.

4

following Monday was a Court date.

5

about it.

6

Q.

And you're talking about June 3rd of 2003?

7

A.

Correct.

8

Q.

Okay.

9

A.

I had no knowledge whatsoever of that Court date.

10

Q.

Has it subsequently been taken care of?

11

A.

Well, when we were working with —

It was stuck in a pile of papers.

I don't

Apparently the

I didn't know anything

The envelope was never opened.

I was working with

12

Mr. Nakamura, we were working towards the order to show cause

13

hearing and the evidentiary hearing of August 2 9th.

14

in time in July he made me aware of the potential issue of the

15

cease and desist order in the state of Nevada, as well as this

16

check issue, and the warrant out for my arrest.

17

know nothing about it."

18

Some point

I said, "I

I have dates, times, substance of every conversation

19

for the most part that I had with Mr. Nakamura.

20

those here, but I could refer to them if I had them.

21

I don't have

As soon as I heard about the failure to appear I

22

called the Sparks Justice Court.

I asked them about it,

23

inquired.

24

appear.

25

said there was a $500 cash only bond that was due.

They explained to me that there was a failure to
I asked them what I needed to do to resolve it.

They

I said,
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"How could I get it to you?"

2

Western Union Quick Pay, I believe it was.

3

They said I could send it via

Immediately that day, as soon as I found out about

4

it, I got $500 cash, wired it —

5

Court, and I was supposed to show up I believe it was the end

6

of July for an arraignment.

7

set aside for a prelim.

8

failure to appear and not guilty on the check charge.

9

Subsequently

or Western Unioned it to the

I was arraigned, and then it was

At the prelim- I pled not guilty to a

—

10

Q.

How much was the check for; do you recall?

11

A.

$79.

12

Q.

The whole thing?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Okay, go ahead.

15

A.

Since that time there was —

It was less than $100.

Court was set for

16

December 4th to hear that.

17

because I self-surrendered in Menden on August 29th.

18

was in Court.

19

called the Court at that time and got an extension to October

20

the 14th, I believe it was.

21

case whatsoever.

22

Subsequently I was in custody
So I

I had an attorney named William Rouses.

He

No disposition was done on that

I was still in custody.

Mr. Rouses was supposed to

23

get another extension, and I believe —

I don't know for sure,

24

but I believe he entered my plea of not guilty.

25

paid a $10,1 find out of his own trust account, and the Court

Mr. Rouses
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refunded my $500 bail.

2

was closed, as far as I know, because the Court sent my bail

3

back to me.

4

Q.

That was my question.

5

A.

I believe so.

6

Q.

(Inaudible) about that and Mr. Thomas what happened

7

after June 3rd.

8

out of (inaudible).

9

A.

They sent it back to me and that case

So that case is closed, right?

That's my question.

That's the series of —

So as far as you know it's

that's the series of events,

10

but I don't know how they could have entered my plea, because

11

I'd never went to Court because I'd been in custody that whole

12

time, but I know that they refunded my bail money of $500.

13

Q.

All right.

So you got your money back on that one?

14

A.

Correct.

15

Q.

Okay, and the next issue.

16

A.

The other issue is the accusation on the cease and

Do you

—

17

desist that I received —

18

March of 2003.

19

—

20

them.

21

subsequently now they're trying to cause me some trouble.

22

I believe originally I received it in

Mr. Rives and Vanessa Wright were complaining

they entered into some contracts with me to do some work for
I did the work.

I performed.

They were not happy, and

My understanding from talking to Mr. Rives that he

23

did call Mr. Hines sometime first part of 2003, and Mr. Hines

24

represented to Mr. Rives that I was convicted in the state of

25

Utah, which made Mr. Rives panic.

There is no judgment of
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conviction here in the state of Nevada.

That's what started

2
3

the ball rolling, I mean, in the state of Utah.

4

judgment of conviction here.

5

There's no

My client at that time was panicked, thinking I

6

was a convicted criminal in the state of Utah and I did not

7

disclose that.

8

Institutions.

9

I had it in writing.

10

They complained to the Department of Financial
At that point in time I was made aware of that.

I contacted the financial institutions.

11

the investigator right now.

12

file in my office.

13

to him, explained to him what I was doing.

14

I don't know

I have it all memorialized in a

I talked to him, talked to him and talked

I was in fact an employee of Mortgage IT, which is a

15

mortgage company out of New York.

16

branch.

17

of Nevada under their license.

18

New York.

19

I have it in writing that that issue of the cease and desist, I

20

was not violating any laws because I was operating legally

21

under another license.

22

law.

23
24
25

I was operating in that

I was a legally licensed mortgage broker in the state
He contacted legal counsel in

They went back and forth.

It was —

I was told and

I made sure that I was complying with

After this, I believe about six months passed after
that.
Q.

No one heard anything on it until

—

Excuse me, did you have a hearing on the cease and
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desist order?

2

A.

No.

3

Q.

As to its validity or otherwise?

4

A.

No.

5

Q.

In Nevada?

6

A.

No, nothing.

7

desist.

8

suit.

All they did was issue a cease and

They didn't file a complaint.

They didn't file a

9

Q.

Did you comply with that order?

10

A.

Pardon me?

11

Q.

Did you comply with that order?

12

A.

Yes, I wasn't in violation of it.

About six months

13

passed, to about July.

14

Department of Financial Institutions is going to move forward

15

on the cease and desist.

16

Then I get the rumblings that the

I faxed another fax to the investigator that I was

17

working with in March and said, "Hey, I thought this was

18

resolved.

19

the cease and desist."

20

I haven't heard anything.

Would you please resend

I then went personally into the Financial Institution

21

Office, which is in Carson City, which I live, and talked to

22

I think a Larry —

23

don't know that that's correct.

24

investigator or someone else that worked with the AG's office

25

there, and I explained to them that I thought that that cease

I want to say Hatfield, but I can't —

I

Talked to him and there was an
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and desist was resolved in March.

2

rescinsion.

3

Would they give me a

"We don't give recinsions," they said.

"We just leave

4

it out there.

5

I didn't violate it and it was proven that I was an employee of

6

a mortgage company and licensed appropriately.

7

You're just not supposed to violate it."

Well,

Subsequently the financial institutions took it to the

8

Department of Consumer Affairs, and I have some copies of the

9

correspondence with me, that they wanted to see how they could

10

get me on this cease and desist.

11

taking money supposedly without providing a service.

12

There was two complaints of

The Department of Consumer Affairs —

or there was an

13

interoffice memo.

14

they could do.

15

two, it was not a securities issue because they didn't know

16

nothing about —

17

who I've talked to off and on for a couple of years since this

18

thing started in 2000 —

19

2001.

20

where I was.

21

securities issue.

22

that wasn't securities issues.

23

Everybody seemed to think there was nothing

I was not in violations, number one.

Number

the investigator with Securities Department,

the year 2000.

I was arrested in

I've been in touch with the people of Nevada.
They knew I had Counsel.

They knew

They had no issue with

They had other things that came before them

So this went on, from my understanding, a formal

24

complaint.

Finally they went out of the Department of

25

Financial Institutions to the Department of Consumer Affairs
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with the AG's Office sometime at the end of May.

2

They couldn't make it stick on me with regards to the

3

mortgage business, so they twisted it around and made it sound

4

like I was obtaining money under false pretenses.

5

an investigation was held from about the end of May until about

6

July or August when they issued the warrant for my arrest I

7

believe on August 20th.

8
9

Subsequently

Now, on August 20th, on August 20th when they issued
that warrant, I had Counsel here in Utah, Blake Nakamura.

10

The state of Nevada never contacted him and said, "We have a

11

warrant for his arrest.

12

Do you want to work a surrender?"

I had Counsel in Nevada at the time, and I have two

13

letters that put the State of Department of Securities on

14

notice and the Department of Financial Institutions on notice

15

that Ryan Earl —

16

of record.

17

to talk to him about, they should talk to him.

18

contact him whatsoever, and this was even in the midst when the

19

warrant was issued.

20

I'm sorry, yeah, Ryan Earl was my attorney

That if they had any problems, if they had anything
They did not

From my understanding there's a certain protocol or at

21

least a —

oh, what's the word.

I don't want to say ethics,

22

that if a warrant is issued and someone is represented by

23

Counsel —

24

got a lot of stuff going on —

25

warrant for your arrest —

and I was represented in two states, because I've
but they would say, "We have a

for your client's arrest.

What do
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you want to do about it?"

2

Finding out after the fact, Ms. Duffy pigeonholed the

3

warrant.

4

procedure.

5

a warrant out for this guy's arrest."

6

The plan was for —

7

on August 29th and use that warrant as an exclamation point for

8

that order to show cause and have me arrested here.

9

Did not put it on NCIC, which is normal standard
You put it on where everybody knows, "Hey, there's
Did not put it on NCIC.

to get me here for the order to show cause

We only found out about that warrant I believe late

10

on the 27 th , and I think that came from conversations from

11

Mr. Thomas to Mr. Nakamura.

12

day of the 28th, which was the day prior to the 29th, being here,

13

I had already had my plane ticket to come here.

14

had my car rental set up to come here, my hotel.

15

here every single time for the last two-and-a-half years.

16

Never missed a Court date.

17

need to.

18
19

He made me aware of that.

The

I'd already
I have come

I've come here twice when I didn't

MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, I'd object.

It's both non-

responsive and irrelevant.

20

THE COURT: Yeah, why don't we get off the narrative a

21

little bit, and try and do this a little cleaner with questions

22

and answers.

23

but

24
25

I appreciate your telling me a story about it,

—
THE WITNESS: I'm just trying to get in the facts, your

Honor, you know, and I subsequently

—
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2

MR. THOMAS: Objection, nonresponsive.
Q.

BY MR. BEASLIN: Now, let me just ask you, then what

3

happened on the 29th when you were supposed to be here in Vernal

4

on the other charge?

5
6

MR. THOMAS: Objection as to relevance.
alleged anything in regards to the 29th.

7
8
9
10

THE COURT: Well, I think it goes to —
ability to complete his performance here.
Q.

I'll let him answer.

yourself in on the 29th of August; is that true?
A.

Let me fast track.

12

Q.

Go ahead.

14

somewhat to his

BY MR. BEASLIN: So let me just ask you, you turned

11

13

We haven't

THE WITNESS: Will you indulge me just for a minute,
your Honor?

15

THE COURT: Go ahead.

16

THE WITNESS: I had a bailiff friend, a warrant's

17

officer, a private investigator and two attorneys all try to

18

get me to self-surrender on the 28th.

19

I couldn't.

20

It wasn't in the system.

We got a copy, I believe, from Mr. Thomas of the

21

warrant, and I saw the Judge's name who signed it, who I had

22

been in front of his Court for ten years on civil matters,

23

respected his signature, and I was in —

24

and everything.

25

him and Mr. Nakamura were on a conference call, and I found out

I was —

had my ticket

I was in John Springate's office, and between
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who the Judge was, and I said, "Well, out of respect for his

2

Court."

3

Then they said, "Now we know that you have a warrant

4

out of Nevada, we can't suggest that you leave Nevada.

5

if you leave Nevada, you're a fugitive from Nevada and you'll

6

be arrested in Utah.

7

fugitive from Utah.

8

Counsel — " and I was in Reno.

9

airport to come here —

10

So

If you don't go to Utah, you'll be a
It's best —

our suggestion to you, as
I was five minutes from the

"is that you self-surrender."

So on the morning of the 29th I self-surrendered, like

11

I had Counsel to do so, and soon as I got —

12

surrendered, I had money in the bank.

13

bail, I could have been out of there, and I had millions of

14

dollars worth of business going on.

15

plea in abeyance by the end of December.

16

as soon as I self-

I could have paid my

I could have satisfied the

But as soon as I was booked into custody, someone from

17

here called, said, "Do you have Schubarth in custody?"

"Yes."

18

Then there was a fugitive failure to appear from here.

I

19

wasn't a fugitive from the state.

20

left the state.

21

the order to show cause hearing.

22

I wasn't in the state and

I just was in custody and I couldn't come to

Then subsequently I sat in jail there until I was

23

finally able to bail out I believe on September 17th.

24

had the extradition hearing on the 19th of December, and the

25

Judge said, "What do you want to do?"

Then we

I said, "Get me to Utah
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as fast as possible."

2

sat here ever since.

3
4

Q.

They picked me up on the 29th and I've

BY MR. BEASLIN: Now, what about October 20 —

about

the 14 th of October you had a preliminary hearing?

5

A.

There was a preliminary hearing.

6

Q.

Were you there?

7

A.

Originally there was only two charges of obtaining

8

money under false pretenses.

9

Q.

Were you there in Justice Court?

10

A.

I was there, but subsequently a third charge and a

11
12

fourth charge was added after I was arrested.
Q.

Well, that's your second amended complaint, but

13

pending before the District Court in Nevada in Douglas County,

14

these four charges, right?

15

A.

Yeah, it hasn't been

—

16

Q.

You're not convicted of any of those?

17

A.

It hasn't been proven.

I haven't been proven guilty.

18

It hasn't been to trial.

19

February, with an alternative date in March and one in August,

20

I believe.

21

Q.

Okay.

It's set for I believe the end of

Now, as to the issue of the money, the records

22

would show and certify that you paid $10,000 May 28th, $12,880

23

in July.

24
25

A.

Is that all of the payments that you've made?
Those are the payments I've made.

at that time.

They were current

As of July 8th I was compliant.

Subsequently my
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next payment was November 26thr

2

filed a motion with this Court for them —

3

extend my next payment.

4

and I was in custody, and I
for this Court to

I thought I asked for the end of February, and then my

5

cutoff date for the end of December, to extend that to the end

6

of March so that I could still have the opportunity to comply,

7

but since I've been jail, then, from that motion another couple

8

months, I don't know that that is realistic, but I'm sure that

9

if they moved it to the next review date, which was in May,

10
11
12

that I could substantially comply.
Q.

So you've been in jail either in Nevada or in Utah

since August 29th?

13

A.

Tomorrow will be 22 weeks.

14

Q.

Okay, I believe that's all.

15

A.

No.

16

MR. BEASLIN: Okay.

17
18

Anything else you have?

All right, thank you.

CROSS EXAMINATION
BY MR. THOMAS:

19

Q.

You were served a cease and desist order in Nevada?

20

A.

In March sometime.

21

Q.

I didn't ask for anything other than you were served a

22

Actually if —

I've

—

cease and desist order in Nevada.

23

A.

I was mailed a cease and desist order.

24

Q.

Okay, and you are very concerned about making the

25

victims whole; is that a fair statement?
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A.

Very correct.

2

Q.

And as a matter of fact, you were so concerned about

3

making the victims in Vernal whole, that you talked to

4

Mr. Nakamura about a plan to have them paid off by the end

5

of December?

6

A.

I didn't talk to him about a plan, no.

7

Q.

You talked to Mr. Nakamura and suggested that during

8

the plea negotiations, if you had the victims paid off by

9

December, it would be a better deal for you?

10

A.

There were no negotiations.

Mr. Nakamura just dropped

11

the deal on me and basically said, "Take it.

You have six

12

years to pay it off."

13

if we paid it off sooner, could some of this stuff be dropped

14

or go away?"

I said, "What if sweeten the deal, and

15

Q.

Okay, and that was negotiated with Mr. Nakamura

16

A.

There was no negotiation.

17
18
19

—

It was a suggestion that I

put to him and he put to you folks.
Q.

And we —

those suggestions were made before your

hearing date?

20

A.

No, the day of the hearing.

21

Q.

The day of the hearing?

22

A.

The day of the hearing in the conference room outside.

23

Q.

Okay, and they had never been raised before then?

24

A.

No.

25

Q.

Okay, and so when Mr. Nakamura gave you the plea
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negotiation, it included that even though it was your idea?

2
3

A.

It didn't include that, because it was added that

morning.

4

Q.

5

on you

6

A.

I thought you said the plea agreement was just dropped
—
The plea agreement was dropped on me that day, and it

7

was set for six years.

No one said there was a three-year

8

statute, and I asked to counter —

9

—

I guess that's the verbiage

counter the deal, that one year, or sweeten the deal would

10

be if I paid it off by the end of 2003, if —

11

at the end of 2008 —

12

this would be reduced to one Class A.

I believe it was

would be reduced to four Class A's, and

13

Q.

And that had not been negotiated before that day?

14

A.

Not to my understanding.

15

Q.

Even though it was in the typewritten text in the plea

16
17

negot —
A.

plea agreement?
I don't recall that.

18

morning.

19

that morning.

20

Q.

It was that morning.

We argued about it all that

I was prepared to walk out of here and go to trial

So if I were to tell you that the typewritten plea

21

agreement includes that, you wouldn't believe that that was

22

negotiated beforehand?

23

A.

It could have been typed afterwards, because I believe

24

that we'd have to listen to the tapes.

25

draft.

That there was a rough

I initialed down the side of the rough draft, and the
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completed copy was done after the fact.

2

morning and typed later

3
4
5

Q.

So that was added that

—

In fact, the changes that were made were actually

handwritten on this document, weren't they?
A.

I was given a rough draft that morning, and the

6

complete agreement was done after that hearing.

7

understanding.

8
9
10
11

Q.

That was my

But you signed the document in Court that day with no

changes?
A.

It was a rough draft with initials down the list.

That's what I remember.

12

Q.

Okay, but that's the document you signed?

13

A.

Pardon me?

14

Q.

That was the document you signed?

15

A.

That included that adjustment, correct.

16

Q.

Okay, but that wasn't handwritten.

17

typed in?

18

A.

19
20

That had been

My understanding was handwritten in, and the full

agreement was typed in later.
MR. THOMAS: Your Honor, do you have a copy of the

21

plea agreement?

I don't have the Court's copy, but all of my

22

amendments are handwritten, and these particular ones are not,

23

and it only goes to the allegation the defendant did not have

24

prior notice.

25

to this time, your Honor.

Those negotiations had been entered into prior
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THE COURT: Where am I to look on this?

2

MR. THOMAS: I would look —

there was a handwritten

3

change on a page that sets forth the —

if I may approach, sets

4

forth the restitution amount farther into the document.

5

will note the plea of guilty was changed to no contest in

6

handwriting.

7

THE COURT: Yeah, that (inaudible).

8

MR. THOMAS: Yeah, there we go.

9

handwritten notes striking some language there.

You

You'll note the
What the State

10

is attempting to demonstrate is —

and then if you'll flip to

11

the next page, it does talk about in the second full paragraph

12

that if this Court comes for review on December 23rd, it sets

13

forth the agreement that Mr. Schubarth is suggesting, that

14

he'll actually receive less convictions in that paragraph and

15

the one after.

16

just suggesting that defendant in fact was aware and involved

17

with the plea negotiations prior to that particular day.

18

That's all I have.

Those are all typed in.

It's a minor point,

19

THE COURT: Okay, anything further?

20

MR. BEASLIN: Well, I just —

the plea agreement,

21

Mr. Schubarth says that if the defendant does not have all of

22

the restitution paid on or before December 31st 2003, but does

23

have it paid by or before December 31st, 2008, then the matter

24

will come before the Court for review in November 2008.

25

what he signed.

That's
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MR. THOMAS: The previous page is where it's the

2

sweeter deal.

3

sets forth

The previous page, second paragraph starts

—

—

4

MR. BEASLIN: Is that this matter?

5

MR. THOMAS: Right, and it just sets forth

6

MR. BEASLIN: Yeah.

7

MR. THOMAS: —

—

largely the same thing Mr. Schubarth

8

suggested was that if he pays it off early, he receives a

9

greater benefit.

10

MR. BEASLIN: Okay.

11

MR. THOMAS: The mere point is Mr. Schubarth was

12

involved with those negotiations beforehand.

13

dropped on him.

14

other changes that were made that morning, as clearly indicated

15

were handwritten changes to the document.

16

It wasn't just

It was actually typed into the document.

Any

MR. BEASLIN: And it further appears that those are

17

related to 1 to 13, 14 to 26, but 27, 8 and 9 —

18

—

well, 27 to 30

the four of those you were talking about?

19

MR. THOMAS: Right, yes.

20

MR. BEASLIN: The four are the ones that he pled to.

21

MR. THOMAS: Right.

22

MR. BEASLIN: And would be sentenced on as I understand

23

the agreement; is that true?

24

MR. THOMAS: Correct.

25

MR. BEASLIN: Okay.

I believe that's all, your Honor.
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2

THE COURT: Okay, thank you.

Anything further, then,

Mr. Beaslin?

3

MR. BEASLIN: No, that's all I have, your Honor.

4

THE COURT: Okay, anything?

5

MR. THOMAS: No, your Honor.

6

THE COURT: Okay.

7

MR. THOMAS: I'll reserve.

8

MR. BEASLIN: Well, I believe you have the facts,

9

your Honor.

Argument?

So I think that you can interpret those from

10

what Mr. Schubarth has said here today, and also the fact that

11

(inaudible) he was in fact incarcerated he did pay what would

12

be the $22,800, which was the first payment, but the same was

13

late.

14

his inability to pay was because he was incarcerated on August

15

the 29th and has not been out of jail since then.

16

been no opportunity for him to pay, your Honor.

It was $22,880, actually, but subsequent to that, then,

17

MR. THOMAS: All right.

So there's

As to each allegation the

18

defendant did not timely pay, the State is only relying on

19

that first payment.

20

—

21

two days.

22

balance of that was approximately two months late.

23

concern of the State's, and I do believe it's a violation of

24

the agre ement.

25

It was —

initially the first payment was

that he made was $10,000 later than the six months only by
That's not anything to worry about.

However, the
It was a

As to the cease and desist order, he was issued a
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cease and desist order out of Nevada and charged with a bad

2

check.

3

evidence as to the outcome of those things, but the conduct

4

is concerning because of the nature of the charges in Utah.

5

The State understands that they didn't present any

Most significantly, though, I think if you look at the

6

final allegation, and that was the fact that he had been bound

7

over.

8

State of Nevada, that he committed new offenses.

9

well aware that the standard for an order to show cause is just

That means that he met a probable cause standard in the
The Court is

10

preponderance of evidence.

So the State would allege or argue

11

that it has met its burden, and would ask the Court to enter

12

all of the pleas against the defendant.

13

THE COURT: As to the Court?

14

MR. THOMAS: No, as to all of them.

15

THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry.

16

MR. THOMAS: If he's not in compliance with the plea

17

in abeyance, the State would ask that all of the pleas enter

18

against the defendant.

19

THE COURT: What about the ones he already pled to?

20

MR. THOMAS: The ones he already pled to I don't think

21
22

are an issue.

I think those are dealt with.

THE COURT: As I understand it, Mr. Thomas, your

23

initial hearing, the one in which we issued the warrant was

24

just those allegations.

25

he was late with his first payment; is that correct?

You wanted to set this aside because
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MR. THOMAS: That was initially it, but we also had

2

some difficulty.

3

going on.

4

allegations including the bind over on the criminal charges

5

in Nevada.

6

We knew that there was the investigation

Subsequently we went ahead and made the new

There should be a second amended set of allegations,

1,

your Honor, before the Court, and in that second amended it

8

sets forth the basis for the order to show cause.

9

4A, the defendant did not timely pay his restitution.

In paragraph
4B, the

10

defendant had been ordered —

or served a cease and desist

11

order in Nevada.

12

passing a check without sufficient funds.

13

was an issue —

14

appear, and paragraph E, committed the crimes of theft by

15

false pretenses.

16

Subsequently he's been bound over on four counts.

Paragraph C, there was a complaint filed for
Paragraph D, there

or there was a warrant issued for failure to

At that point we had two counts listed.

17

THE COURT: Well, the Court, hearing the evidence here

18

this morning would indicate that Mr. Schubarth admitted having

19

been served the cease and desist order.

20

order demonstrates a pattern of conduct which concerns the

21

Court, because that's what happened here in Utah in the present

22

case.

23

I'm not going to give a lot —

The cease and desist

any reliance on the

24

theft by false pretenses case.

He hasn't been convicted yet.

25

He has a presumption of innocence on that.

There is an aura,
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a penumbra of Mr. Schubarth's pattern of conduct, though, and

2

that is —

3

that does concern the Court.

I'm not going to use that for a basis.

He did violate

4

a law.

He wrote a bad check and was apparently satisfied that

5

in the Sparks, Nevada Justice Court, and he did not make the

6

payment of $22,880 on the due date.

7

substantial time period to come up with the balance, and that

8

alone would be a violation of the plea in abeyance.

9

get it violated right up front.

10

It took him another

We better

I' 11 order that the plea in abeyance be violated, and

11

that the counts pled to, the no contest counts be taken off the

12

shelf and entered.

13

and Parole.

I'll order a report from Adult Probation

We'll set this for sentencing.

14

COURT CLERK: How far out?

15

THE COURT: Sixty days, probably.

16

COURT CLERK: March 30th.

17

THE COURT: March 30th.

18

Give us a date.

Do you want to withdraw those

exhibits?

19

MR. THOMAS: Yes, if I may.

20

THE COURT: Okay.

21

(Hearing concluded.)

Thank you.

We're in recess.
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